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THE AMERICAN LAW'S TREATMENT of charity has
a long history. Its modem expression derives from the English
Statute of Charitable Uses,' enacted in 1601, which contained
the first extensive definition of charitable purposes. The
statute's aim was public benefit, expressed principally by the
relief of poverty.2 Over time, charitable public benefit was
seen as a broad mantle, including not only the relief of pover-
ty, but also advancement of education, religion, and health.
This attitude came over to the New World with the colonists,3
and was incorporated into federal4 and then state tax
t B.A., Barnard College; J.D. Candidate Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, 1996. The author would like to thank Professor Maxwell J. Mehlman for his incisive
comments and generous support, and Professor Laura B. Chisolm for her accessibility and
encouragement throughout the writing of this Note.
1. An Act to Redress Misemployment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of Money Heretofore
Given to Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (Eng. 1601) [hereinafter Statute of Charitable Uses]. In
Commissions for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, 61 Q.B. 265, 290 (1891) Lord
McNaughton analyzes the definitions of charity that were the foundation for the Statute of
Charitable Uses. Lord McNaughton states the following:
'Charity' in its legal sense comprises... trusts for... purposes beneficial to the
community. [They]... are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because inci-
dentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity that deserves
the name must do either directly or indirectly.
Id. at 290. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983) (quoting Lord
McNaughton's opinion from Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel).
2. See GAREH JONEs, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARrrY 1532-1827, at 26-27 (1969).
3. See generally HOWARD S. MiLLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
PHoANFHRoPY 1776-1844 (1961) (discussing the English law of charity).
4. Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides exemption from income taxation
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codes,5 which provide tax exemptions and benefits6 to a cer-
for organizations described in subsections (c) or (d) or section 401(a). Subsection (c)(3) includes
"[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational
purposes .... " I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
5. See generally ALA. CONST. art IV, § 91 (1996) (holding charitable organizations
exempt from property taxation); ARm REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1201 (West 1996) (exempting
charitable organizations from property taxation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-303 (Michie 1987)
(exempting charitable nonprofit organizations from property taxation); ALASKA CONST. art. IX, §
4 (1995) (exempting from taxation nonprofit charitable corporations); CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §
214 (West 1996) (exempting from state taxation property used, organized, and operated
exclusively for hospital purposes); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-3-111.5 (1996) (stating that property
used for charitable purposes is exempt from taxes); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-88 (West 1995)
(exempting from taxation real property owned by nonprofit charitable institutions); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. IX § 8105 (1996) (exempting from local taxation property owned by nonprofit charitable
institutions); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1002, 47-1802 (1995) (providing property and income tax
exemptions for nonprofit charitable institutions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.001 (West 1996)
(exempting charitable organizations from taxation); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-41 (1996) (exempting
nonprofit hospitals' property from taxation); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 246-32 (Michie 1996)
(exempting from taxation property owned by a corporation engaged in charity, and organized and
operated for such purpose); IDAHO CODE § 63-105K, repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 98 § I (effective
Jan. 1, 1997); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/205 (West 1996) (exempting from taxation property
used exclusively for charitable purposes); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-10-16 (West 1996) (exempting
from taxation land and buildings used for charitable purposes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1(9)
(West 1995) (exempting charitable organization from property taxation); KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 1
(1995) (exempting charitable institutions from taxation); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 136.395 (Banks-
Baldwin 1996) (providing an exemption from premium tax); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.495
(Banks-Baldwin 1996) (extending the exemption from sales tax to resident-nonprofits qualified
for the income tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 141.040 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (exempting charitable institutions from income
tax); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 305 (West 1996) (providing exclusion and exemptions from state
taxation to charitable organizations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2067 (West 1992)
(exempting hospitals from taxation); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROPERTY § 7-202 (1996) (providing
for property tax exemption for charitable organizations); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 176A, § 19
(West 1996) (exempting from state, city, county, district, and municipal taxes nonprofit charitable
hospitals); MICE. COMP. LAws ANN. § 205.54 (West 1996) (exempting hospitals and other
institutions from taxation); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 272.02, 290.05 (West 1996) (exempting
charitable institutions from property, income, and franchise taxation); Mss. CODE ANN. §§ 27-7-
29, 27-13-63 (1996) (providing for exemption from income and franchise taxation for charitable
institutions); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.101 (Vernon 1996) (holding charitable institutions exempt
from property taxation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-6-201 (1995) (providing exemption from
property taxation); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-1903 (1995) (providing exemption from property
taxation); NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.140 (1995) (creating exemption from property taxes); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:23 (1988) (exempting charitable institutions from property taxation); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1996) (providing exemption from property taxation to nonprofit
charitable organizations); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a (McKinney 1996) (exempting from
taxation real property owned by charitable corporations); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-22-11, 7-2A-4
(Michie 1996) (providing exemptions from state, local, corporate income, and franchise taxes);
N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1995) (providing a property tax exemption); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
105.278.8, 105.130.11 (1995) (exempting nonprofit hospitals from property tax, and classifying
those corporations that are exempt from federal income taxation as also exempt from state income
taxes); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38 (1995) (providing exemption to those organizations exempt
from federal taxation); Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 140.08 (Baldwin 1995) (exempting hospitals
from all taxes); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2359 & tit. 36, § 2617 (West 1996) (exempting from
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tain class of nonprofit corporations.7
Although hospitals are not specifically mentioned, non-
profit hospitals are exempt from federal taxation under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code under the general head-
ing of charity, and have received the benefits conferred upon
exempt organizations. These benefits, however, have not come
without a price Since there is no theoretical construct to ex-
plain empirically why the tax law of charitable nonprofits is
structured as it is,9 there has been no clear rationale guiding
income tax those organizations that are exempt from federal income taxation, and exempting
nonprofit hospitals from state, county, district, and municipal taxation); OR. REV. STAT. §§
307.130, 317.080 (providing property tax exemption to charitable organizations and exemption
from corporation excise tax to organizations that are exempt from federal taxation); 72 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5020-204 (1996) (providing exemption from property taxation); 1996 R.I. PUB.
LAWS § 252 (to be codified at R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-3-3) (exempting any incorporated public
charitable institution from property taxation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-1890 (Law Co-op. 1995)
(exempting hospitals from property and income taxes); S.D. CODnFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 10-4-9.3,
10-45-14.1, 10-46-15 (1996) (exempting property owned by nonprofit healthcare organizations
from property taxation and nonprofit hospitals from sales and use taxation); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
67-5-212, 67-2-104, 676-322 (1996) (exempting charitable organizations from property, income,
and sales taxation); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18 (West 1995) (exempting charitable
organizations from property taxation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1101 (1996) (exempting
charitable organizations from property taxation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3802 (1995)
(exempting charitable organizations from property taxation); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-6W9.8
(Michie 1996) (exempting from property taxation organizations exempt from federal taxation
under section 501(c)(3)); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 84.36.040 (1996) (exempting nonprofit
hospitals from property taxation); W. VA. CODE § 11-3-9 (1996) (exempting nonprofit healthcare
organizations from property taxation); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.26 (West 1996) (exempting
charitable corporations from income taxation); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-201 (Michie 1996)
(providing exemption from property taxation for charitable institutions).
6. Benefits include the ability to offer tax exempt bonds in order to raise capital, the
ability to attract grants from private foundations, and eligibility for preferential second and third-
class postal rates. See THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HoPKINS, THE LAw OF TA-EXEMPT
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 21-23 (1995).
7. Tax exemption is granted to nonprofit organizations that are organized and operated for
the public benefit. See I.R.C. § 501. See also note 8 infra (explaining conditions for establishing
tax exempt status).
8. Section 501(c)(3) requires that exempt organizations be organized and operated for the
public benefit, rather than for private interests. To do this, organizations must observe the non-
distributional constraint, which requires that no part of the exempt entity's net earnings inure to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. Further, no substantial part of the activities of
the exempt organization may include propagandizing, or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation, nor may the exempt organization participate in, or intervene in, any political
campaign. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1(a-c) (outlining organizational and
operational tests for exemptions for charitable organizations).
9. The legislative history accompanying the promulgation of the federal income tax is
curiously silent on the reasons for granting tax exemption to particular types of organizations.
Theorists have since attempted to articulate coherent theories. Under the traditional public benefit
subsidy theory, charitable tax exemption is justified on the basis of the public benefit conferred by
the exempt organization, and is offered in order to "encourage activities that were recognized as
inherently meritorious and conducive to the general welfare." Chauncey Belknap, The Federal
1997]
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Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in IV RE-
SEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE [FILER] COMIUSSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND
PuBuc NEEDS 2025, 2039 (1977).
The capital subsidy theory views exemption as a needed device that enables nonprofits to
gain access to capital markets otherwise foreclosed to them by virtue of the nondistributional
constraint and the inadequate availability of debt financing. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale
For Exempting Nonprofit Organizations From Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72-
75 (1981). A nonprofit organization's "ability to accumulate retained earnings is of substantial
importance as a means of capital expansion." Id. Retained earnings can be used to finance capital
improvements, and are tied, to some degree, to the amount of debt financing a nonprofit can
obtain. This is because "capital purchased with such earnings provides an extra margin of
security for the debt, and [because] the cash flow from such earnings is evidence to lenders that
interest payments on the debt can be covered." l An income tax on nonprofits would substan-
tially erode these retained earnings, "further crippl[ing] a group of organizations that is already
capital-constrained" Id. Moreover, the subsidy is justified because nonprofits are more efficient
than their for-profit analogues in providing those services characterized by contract failure.
Contract failure occurs in instances where, because of the type of goods or services, "the cost of
capital subsidy provided by corporate tax exemption may be more than compensated for by the
efficiency gains deriving from the expansion of nonprofit producers that the subsidy encourages."
Id.
Arguing for the donative theory, Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable
Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV.
307, 390 (1991) [hereinafter Charitable Status], declare that "the primary rationale for the
charitable exemption is to subsidize those organizations capable of attracting a substantial level of
donative support from the public." By attracting public donations, the entity demonstrates its
deservedness, incorporating notions of worthiness and neediness, through the entity's need to seek
donations and the "willingness of the public to contribute" to the entity. Mark A. Hall & John D.
Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OIO ST. L. 1379,1381-89
(1991) (suggesting a charitable exemption test based on institutions' dependence on public
donations) [hereinafter Donative Theory]. Thus, "the existence of substantial donative support
from the public at large signals the need for an additional ... subsidy," and the exemption
represents the subsidy required "to take up the donative slack." Id. at 1385 (emphasizing the
relationship between public dependence and the need for subsidization).
Observing that some charitable giving can be explained by the psychological effect that
giving has on the donor, Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C.L. REV. 501,
501 (1990) argues that tax exemption is warranted by the nonprofit organizations' founders
decision to forego all profits. As long as a nonprofit organization's assets are used for the benefit
of someone other than those who control the organization, the organization should qualify for a
tax exemption, free from any inquiry about the measure of public benefit derived. For Atkinson,
the "metabenefit of altruistic production would suffice." Id. at 619.
Finally, the income measurement theory rejects the idea that the exemption is a subsidy,
and instead argues that public benefit organizations are exempt because they are improper targets
for taxation. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rabdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
From Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE LJ. 299, 307 (1976) (arguing that the appropriate tax
base and "computing their 'net income' would be a conceptually difficult, if not self-contradictory
task").
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983),
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, wrote that "tax exemptions... are a form of subsidy...
administered through the tax system... [having] much the same effect as a cash grant to the
organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income." This statement cannot be
reconciled with his dissent the same year in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. at
574. In Bob Jones, Justice Rehnquist argued that since Congress did not explicitly enumerate a
public policy requirement in the language of section 501(c)(3), and since in all other respects, Bob
Jones University, a nonprofit private school having racially discriminatory admissions standards,
NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND 501 (C)(3)
what such organizations must do to earn this benefit." In ad-
dition, the definition of the term "charitable" has not been con-
stant." Over the years, the Internal Revenue Service (the Ser-
vice) has required hospitals, in order to qualify for the exemp-
tion, to behave in certain ways regarding the public. In 1956,
the Service proffered the first of its Revenue Rulings dealing
directly with exempt hospitals, requiring them to provide, to
the extent they were able, free or below cost care to indigent
patients. 2 The most recent major pronouncement came in
1969, when the Service, responding to the advent of Medi-
care 4 and Medicaid, 5 redefined the hospitals' responsibility
toward the community. The "charity standard," articulated in
1956, was supplanted by the "community benefit" standard,
which recognized that the promotion of healthcare may be a
charitable purpose, and required that an exempt hospital pro-
vide benefits to a broad class of individuals within the commu-
nity.6
Since 1969, changes in the fabric of society and within the
landscape of healthcare have had an impact on who delivers
qualified as a tax-exempt organization, then it should not have its exemption withdrawn. Id at
612-13,623.
But if a tax exemption is a subsidy, how could this grant be extended, under the U.S.
Constitution, to a racially discriminatory institution? Further, if the exemption is a subsidy, would
not the exemption for a church, upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), violate
the Establishment Clause? Justice Rehnquist recognized this conundrum himself, and addressed it
in a footnote to Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington. There, he indicated that
"[i]n stating that exemptions and deductions... are like cash subsidies .... we do not mean to
assert that they are in all respects identical." Regan, 461 U.S. at 543, n.5.
10. For if the exemption is a traditional subsidy, then it would follow that the government
could insist upon quidpro quo from those accepting the exemption. If, however, the exemption is
rooted in an income measurement problem, then extracting anything in exchange is less
defensible.
11. "Charitable" went from meaning relief of poverty to a broader definition of charitable
purposes, including the promotion of health. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (defining
charitable to include the promotion of health and hospitals).
12. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
13. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 was further refined in 1983 by Rev. Rul. 83-157,
1983-2 C.B. 94, which granted exempt status to specialized hospitals that, because they offer care
for special conditions that are unlikely to require emergency treatment, have no emergency rooms.
14. The Medicare program, entitled Health Insurance for the Aged Act, was created by the
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97,79 Stat. 290 (1965).
15. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1902(13)(B), 79 Stat.
343 (1965) (stipulating that state plans for medical assistance must pay reasonable costs for
inpatient hospital services).
16. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (setting forth new requirements for granting
exemptions to hospitals). See also Section l11 infra.
38519971
386 HEALTH MATR/X [Vol. 7:381
care, 17  how it is delivered, 8  what is delivered, 9  and the
cost of what is delivered.' There have been corresponding
changes with respect to access to healthcare. It is now estimat-
ed that there are forty million Americans2" without the health
insurance that is often the threshold for access to healthcare,
forty to sixty percent of whom are ineligible for Medicaid.'
17. The healthcare industry has undergone striking transformation. This is demonstrated by
the rise in for-profit hospital entities and urgent care centers.
18. Equally dramatic are changes in the method of healthcare delivery. Beginning October
1, 1982, Medicare utilized a prospective payment system based upon diagnostic related groups
(DRGs) to reimburse hospitals for inpatient services. This has lead to a reduction in inpatient
days. In addition, managed care entities like health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have
changed the way healthcare is delivered by offering capitated payments for insureds. Since a
single payment is rendered for a given period, irrespective of the amount of service rendered, then
the incentive exists to limit the amount of service rendered.
19. Coaxial Tomography, Positron Emissions Tomography, Dual Energy X-Ray
Absorptiometry, and Magnetic Resonance Imaging perform diagnostic feats beyond the capacity
of the traditional X-Ray. The use of light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation
(LASER) makes delicate brain surgery possible.
20. In 1965, healthcare expenditures accounted for 5.9% of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). See FRANCES R. HL & BARBARA L. KmscHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF
EXEMPr ORGANIZATIONS § 3.01[l], at 3-3 (1994) (observing that by 1994, national healthcare
expenditures rose by almost four times the rate of inflation). Unique features of U.S. healthcare,
such as "the predominance of the FFS payment system, extensive third-party insurance coverage,
a fragmented multipayer system ... and rapid diffusion of new technologies, contributed to
growth." Nancy DeLew et al., A Layman's Guide to the U.S. Healthcare System, 14 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REv. 151, 159 (1992). In 1994, healthcare expenditures accounted for 13.9% of the
GDP, and by the year 2005 are expected to reach $2.2 trillion, an amount equal to 17.9% of the
GDP. See Sally T. Burner & Daniel R. Waldo, National Health Expenditure Projections, 16
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 221,221 (1995).
21. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION SURvEY (1984);
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMN., U.S. DEPr. OF COMmRCE, U.S. INDuSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1993, at
42-1 (1993); GENERAL ACCOUNTIG OFICE, NoN-PRoFrr HosPrrALS: BErrER STANDARDS
NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMPTON, H.R. Doc. No. 90-84, at 12 (1990) [hereinafter GAO/IH.R. DOc.
90-84]; David Bowermaster & Bruce B. Auster, There They Go Again: This Year's Battle Over
Health Care Reform is a Political Barometer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 8, 1996, at 23
(stating there are 40 million Americans without health insurance in the country today); David M.
Flynn, Hospital Charity Care Standards: Reexamining the Grounds for Exempt Status, 3 J.
TAX'N. EXEMPT ORG. 13, 13 (1992) (observing that the increase in uninsured patients has put
more pressure on the ability of exempt hospitals to provide adequate levels of healthcare in their
communities).
22. See generally Charles B. Gilbert, Health-Care Reform and the Nonprofit Hospital: Is
Tax-Exempt Status Still Warranted?, 26 Utt. LAw. 143,143 (1994) (arguing that being uninsured
is a significant obstacle to receiving healthcare because many uninsured individuals have no
access to medical care except in emergencies); Anne M. Murphy & Tecla A. Murphy, Using the
Emergence of Primary Health Care in Hospital Strategy and Community Reform, Part 1, 25 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 321,321 (1992) (stating that an increasing number of citizens are effectively
denied access to healthcare because they lack health insurance).
23. See Charles J. Milligan, Jr., Provisions ofUncompensated Care in American Hospitals:
The Role of the Tax Code, The Federal Courts, Catholic Health Care Facilities, and Local
Governments in Defining the Problem of Access for the Poor, 31 CATH. LAW. 7, 14 (1989)
(explaining the role of Catholic health facilities in connection with issues of access for the poor,
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The number of uninsureds is expected to grow to sixty-seven
million by the year 2002.24 Congress, alarmed by the rising
healthcare costs and concerned about the economic barriers to
access, has within the last few years attempted to require non-
profit hospitals to deliver greater amounts of uncompensated
care in exchange for the exemption.' To date, these efforts
have failed. But they have not quieted the debate about what a
nonprofit should be required to return to the community. In-
deed, a healthy debate exists as to whether the nonprofit hospi-
tal form should continue to exist at all. What seems
underinsured, and uninsured). See also Murphy & Murphy, supra note 22 (discussing how
employed low-income individuals comprise a large segment of the uninsured).
24. See Bowermaster & Auster, supra note 21, at 23.
25. On February 4, 1991, Representative Edward R. Roybal (D-CA) introduced H.R. 790,
the Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act of 1991, [hereinafter Charity Care
Act], which would require, inter alia, tax exempt hospitals to render an amount of charity care
equal to 50% of the value of the exemption, and other unreimbursed qualified community benefits
equal to 35% of the value of the exemption. On March 12, 1991, Representative Brian Donnelly
(D-MA) introduced H.R. 1374, which would require exempt hospitals to satisfy criteria of charity
care. Neither of these bills passed into law, but the issue did not die.
In 1994, as an amendment to The Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1994),
Representative Richard Gephardt, House Majority Leader, proposed to amend section 501 of the
Internal Revenue Code to include a new subsection. The proposed subsection 501(n) would apply
to 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) organizations that were primarily devoted to providing healthcare
services. The provision would have required exempt organizations to assess community
healthcare needs, to prepare written plans to meet those needs, to perform qualified outreach
services, and to provide medically necessary services without regard to ability to pay. This
provision, like the rest of the Health Security Act, was not enacted. See Section IIC infra.
26. The estimated 1994-98 revenue costs to the federal government of allowing tax-exempt
healthcare providers to receive deductible contributions and to issue tax-exempt bonds are $8.8
billion and $10.8 billion respectively. See Robert A. Boisture, Health Reform Speeds Shift To Tax-
Exempt Integrated Managed Care Plans, 11 HEALTHSPAN 3, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Health
Reform]. Boisture offers no figures for the value of the exemption from income taxation, arguing
that its value might be relatively small, on the assumption that hospitals are basically break-even
operations that would have relatively little taxable income. Id. However, by another analysis, the
value might be sizable, given "the substantial capital reserves accumulated by many tax-exempt
hospitals." Id. Another view estimates the collective value of nonprofit hospitals' tax advantages
at 7.8% of net revenues, of which the income tax exemption comprises 1.5% of hospitals' net
revenues, or $1.6 billion. See John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies for Not-
For-Profit Hospitals, 3 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 161, 162, 167 (1990) (discussing the income tax
exemption for hospitals).
27. John D. Colombo argues that tax exemption for hospitals/healthcare providers is an
anachronism that should be ended. He reasons that services that society greatly values should be
subsidized directly, through funds saved from eliminating healthcare organizations' tax
exemption. See John D. Colombo, John Colombo Says Tax the Hospitals, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 1294, 1295 (1994).
In contrast, Robert A. Boisture observes that the market cannot provide patient-oriented
healthcare services, creating a very real risk that if nonprofit hospitals are deprived of tax-
exemption, patient interests will be sacrificed to provider profit. See generally Robert A. Boisture,
Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations Providing and Financing Health Care Services, 968
ALI-ABA 195 (1994).
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clear is that nonprofit hospitals will be involved in the effort to
address the problem of unequal access to healthcare. Notwith-
standing the failure of the recent national health reform initia-
tive, "both Congress and the IRS are moving once again in the
direction of instituting a specific requirement that healthcare
organizations provide some level or type of charity care ser-
vices in order to retain their tax exemption." Representative
Pete Stark (D-CA), in hearings before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, chal-
lenged the definition of charity care and proposed strict qualifi-
cations and harsh penalties for violations thereof.29 But ending
the subsidy, or redefining the community benefit to require
greater amounts of charity care in exchange for the subsidy
will likely have unfortunate consequences. It will result in less
charity care, as formerly exempt hospitals may close their
doors or convert to for-profit status, where they will be under
no obligation to provide any charity care at all.
This Note explores the continued viability of the prevail-
ing definition of community benefit, presently the Service's
measuring stick for a nonprofit hospital's expression of its
charitable purpose. As currently interpreted, the community
benefit standard is an inadequate measure of the benefits the
community derives from a special class of hospitals, which by
the very nature of what they do, provide a benefit not calculat-
ed in numbers of indigents treated nor easily measured against
the value of the exemption. This Note proposes that a different
measure be taken to define community benefit, reflecting both
the wider scope of the community, and the greater and more
diverse scope of the benefit. For such hospitals, whose research
and innovation reach well beyond local boundaries, the com-
munity benefit standard, as currently defined by the Service, is
too narrow to encompass the many ways in which medicine, as
practiced by these hospitals, has become nationalized.
Section II of this Note will present background material.
Specifically, Section HA will discuss the history of hospitals,
28. HYATr & HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 437.
29. See Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals and Establishment of Charity Care Standards:
Hearing Before the Committee on Ways and Means: HS. 790 and HR. 1374, 102nd Cong. 94-6
(1991) (statement of Representative Fortney Pete Stark).
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and will demonstrate that the place occupied by nonprofit
hospitals within section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code is a
function of history. Section E reviews the history of the
exemption as applied to healthcare organizations. Section IIC
examines recent congressional initiatives aimed at linking the
exemption to provision of a required amount of uncompensated
care, thereby limiting the definition of what constitutes "chari-
table." Section ID looks at state actions to revoke the exempt
status of hospitals by examining the standards the courts have
articulated.
Next, Section III of this Note will critique current efforts
at reforming the exempt status of nonprofit hospitals, including
both the charity care and community benefit standards. This
Section will evaluate the articulated standards of Revenue
Ruling 69-545, the Service's last major pronouncement, and
will demonstrate that although Revenue Ruling 69-545 artic-
ulated a community benefit standard, the actual elements deal
more with charitable benefit than community issues, leading to
the confused expectations society has of nonprofit hospitals.
Next, Section IV proposes that hospitals whose research
has had ramifications beyond the borders of the hospital and its
patients be deemed per se charitable for purposes of tax ex-
empt status, without regard to either a charity or community
benefit test of charitability. Further, Section IV illustrates that
the greater community will benefit from such a policy.
Finally, Section V suggests criteria against which the
Service can determine which hospitals can qualify for this
treatment.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section will address the history of the exemption,
juxtaposed against the history of hospitals. It will illustrate that
the rationale under which hospitals are categorized in the tax
code as charitable organizations is explained by the position of
hospitals in England when the Statute of Uses was enacted, and
in America when the tax exemption was first articulated. This
Section will also illustrate that religion and charity were inter-
twined in early healthcare, and notions of charity infuse the
debate when viewing the hospitals' obligation under the tax
code. But given the modem state of hospitals and medicine, a
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different rationale is needed, for "[a]pplying an 84 year old
statute to today's nonprofit hospitals,... is [a practice] that is
screaming out for examination." Also screaming out for
examination is the application of a twenty-six year old pro-
nouncement, Revenue Ruling 69-545, to a hospital industry
whose changing paradigms31 the Service could not have envi-
sioned when promulgated.
A. History of American Nonprofit Hospitals
Hospitals have not always been viewed as the "most visi-
ble embodiment of medical care in its technically most sophis-
ticated form."'32 From their "earliest origins in preindustrial
societies, hospitals were primarily religious and charitable
institutions for tending to the sick, rather than medical institu-
tions existing for their cure. 33 Spiritual care, prayer, and "re-
ligious provision for the dying predomina[ted]. 34 Medieval
European hospitals, "one branch of a family of institutions of
religious charity or social relief,"35 were tended by clerical or
knightly orders.' Even when, in the later Middle Ages, hospi-
tals were taken over from the religious orders by municipali-
30. James J. McGovern, Transcript of the Winter ABA-EO Committee Meeting: Panel
Three: Significant Issues in the Office for the Associate Chief Counselfor Employee Benefits and
Exempt Organizations, 7 ExEmiyr ORG. TAX REV. 539,556 (1993).
31. See generally John D. Golenski, Paradigm Shift in American Health Care: Are We
Ready for a Comprehensive System?, I HEALTH MATRIX 259, 259 (1991). This article suggests
that society has undergone a paradigm shift in terms of its social metaphor for healthcare, going
from the paternalism model to the model of "medicine as science." Id. Rising healthcare costs,
having reached "proportions threatening to other social goods," unleashed forces that created
another paradigmatic shift, to a model merging "the medicine as science metaphor with the image
of the competitive free market in healthcare services." Id. Sadly, this merger "may have created a
monster" in terms of the staggering numbers of uninsureds and underinsureds, which in turn is
prompting another paradigmatic shift, to a "public utility model," wherein healthcare is
recognized as a basic human need and equitably distributed. Id.
32. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION oF AMERICAN MEDICINE 145 (1982).
33. Id. at 145. See also ROTHA MARY CLAY, THE MEDIEVAL HOsPrrALs OF ENGLAND at
xvii-xviii (1909) (noting that medieval hospitals were "ecclesiastical, not medical institution[s],"
whose preeminent goal was not "the relief of the body, ... but.., the refreshment of the soul").
34. George Rosen, The Hospital: Historical Sociology, in THE HOSPITAL IN MODERN
SOCErY 1, 10 (Eliot Freidson ed., 1963).
35. Eduard Seidler, Medieval Western Hospitals: Social or Health Care Facilities?, in
HISTORY OF HOSPIALS: THE EvOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE FAcILTEs 5, 5 (Yosio Kawakita et
a. eds., 1986) (discussing proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on the Comparative
History of Medicine - East and West).
36. See NICHOLAS ORME & MARGARET WEBSTER, THE ENGLISH HOSPrrAL 1070-1570, at
26(1995).
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ties, hospitals were not secularized but were "religious house[s]
in which the nursing personnel had united as a vocational
community under a religious rule."'  Thus, the medieval hos-
pital was a "locus religiosus38 from an ecclesiastical view-
point, and legally a pia causa,"'39 and as such, enjoyed such
privileges as tax-exemption.'
The colonists brought the tradition of charitable giving
with them to the New World. As in Europe, almshouses, the
forerunners of American hospitals, "serv[ed] general welfare
functions and only incidentally car[ed] for the sick,"41 housing
them together with the elderly, the insane, and the orphaned.42
But in the eighteenth century, the almshouse "metamorphosed
into the modem hospital, first by becoming more specialized in
its functions and then.., more universal in its use."'43 In the
mid-eighteenth century, the first hospitals built specifically to
care for the sick (termed voluntary because they were funded
by voluntary charitable donations rather than by grants from
the public fisc) 4 were opened.4' But the medical care prac-
ticed within these walls was, at best, primitive.' The emer-
gence of these hospitals did not bring an end to the almshouse.
37. Rosen, supra note 34, at 10.
38. Translated from the Latin, it means a place devoted to and serving the purposes of the
clergy.
39. Translated from the Latin, it means a noble cause affected by a sense of obligation or
duty.
40. See Rosen, supra note 34, at 10.
41. See STARR, supra note 32, at 149.
42. See i at 149.
43. Id. at 150.
44. See id. at 151. Donations, however, did not cover all of the costs of care, and voluntary
hospitals required their nonindigent patients to pay a portion of the costs of treatment. See MORRIS
J. VOGEL, THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN HosPTrrAL 14-15 (1980).
45. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Hospital was opened in 1752. Likewise, New York
Hospital opened in 1791 and Boston's Massachusetts General Hospital opened in 1821. See
STARR, supra note 32, at 150.
46. See, e.g., ERwiN H. AcKERKNEcHT, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICINE (1968) (stating
that the germ theory of disease was not fully developed until after the American Civil War, not
until the Crimean War did the relationship of good hospital hygiene and reduced mortality
become apparent); L. EARLE ARNOW, HEALTH IN A BOTTLE (1970) (observing that the first
antibiotic, heralding the conquest of medicine over bacteria, was penicillin, discovered in 1928;
tetracycline became available in 1948); HERBERT BtTTERFIELO, ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE
(1965) (noting that in 1872, the first patient was anesthetized with an injected solution of chIoral
hydrate). See also STARR, supra note 32, at 156 (concluding that control over infection achieved
by antisepsis and asepsis, control over pain achieved by use of anesthesia, and "[ilmprovements in
diagnostic tools, particularly the development of X-Rays in 1895, spurred the advance" of
surgery); VOGEL, supra note 44, at 5.
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As the colonial period ended, so did the preference for provid-
ing assistance to the poor within their homes. The almshouse
became, rather than an option of last resort, the only option, as
state legislatures abolished home aid, hoping to restrict dis-
bursement for public relief by making the almshouse the only
source of governmental assistance to the indigent.' Thus, the
almshouse, out of whose infirmaries public hospitals
evolved,' operated in conjunction with voluntary hospitals,
which attempted to distinguish themselves not only by separat-
ing the sick from the indigent, but by maintaining conditions
conducive to attracting "the more respectable poor with curable
illnesses, as well as... occasional well-to-do people."'49
Discrimination furthered the association between religion,
charity, and hospitals. As hospitals became more important, so
too did staff positions. Physicians did not gain access to these
positions on an equal basis, for "[b]lack and foreign-born doc-
tors.., were almost completely unrepresented on hospital
staffs, [and] appointment decisions depended largely on...
social background."'
47. See STARR, supra note 32, at 145. The shift from home relief to the almshouse has been
explained as an effort to rehabilitate dependents, just as the penitentiary and asylum were
designed to rehabilitate the criminally and the mentally ill. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, 180-205 (1971).
However, an award-winning essay, written in 1876 by Dr. W. Gill Wylie, argues against
this interpretation. Dr. Wylie wrote that, while hospitals were necessary to deal with victims of
contagious epidemics and accident casualties, "to extend hospitals any further was to encourage
pauperism, idleness, and the breakup of the family... by separating the sick from their homes and
their relatives, who are often too ready to relieve themselves of the burden of the sick." W. GILL
WYLIE, HOsprrTALs: THEIR HISTORY, ORGANIZATION, AND CONSTRUCrION 57-66 (1876), quoted
in STARR, supra note 32, at 151. In eliminating home relief, state legislatures may not have been
addressing the indigents as much as other members of their communities, "forcing the immigrant
communities to come up with their own institutions for the poor and the sick." STARR, supra note
32, at 466.
48. Philadelphia General Hospital resulted from the Philadelphia Almshouse. Similarly,
Baltimore County Almshouse grew to become a part of Baltimore City Hospitals, and Bellevue
Hospital evolved from New York Almshouse. See generally STARR, supra, note 32. Bellevue is
America's oldest public hospital and is New York's premiere institution for major emergencies.
See Katherine E. Finkelstein, Bellevue's Emergency, N.Y.TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1996, § 6 at 45 (stating
that Bellevue "is the designated receiving hospital for policemen, firemen and visiting dignitaries
from President Clinton to the Pope").
49. STARR, supra note 32, at 145.
50. Id. at 167. In a 1940 study of appointment decisions in Providence, Rhode Island, one
administrator admitted that competitive examinations for appointment slots had to be
discontinued, for "the persons who did best on the written examinations [were] Jewish." Oswald
Hall, The Stages of a Medical Career, 53 AM. J. Soc. 327, 331 (1948), cited in STARR, supra note
32, at 168.
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Prospective patients, too, had reasons for concern. Open
discrimination against black individuals required that separate
hospitals be formed.5 Catholic patients feared they would not
receive last rites, and Jewish patients feared both ridicule of
their practices and the unavailability of kosher food. Both
Catholics and Jews worried that efforts would be made to
convert them. 2 Therefore, about 1850, a new type of hospital
was formed, primarily religious or ethnic. Once the religious
denomination of these hospitals was established, it was soon
submerged and the hospitals served patients of all faiths.53
These denominational hospitals, like the earlier voluntary hos-
pitals, relied on charitable contributions, although they received
far fewer large endowments than the older, primarily Protestant
voluntaries.'
By the time the first federal income tax was promulgated
in 1894 with the enactment of the first corporate income tax,5"
legislators were accustomed to a society in which, both through
history and contemporary practice, hospitals were closely asso-
ciated with charity and religion. Thus, it is not difficult to see
why hospitals were classified as charitable, and swept into the
first corporate income tax's exemption for "corporations, com-
panies or associations organized and conducted solely for char-
itable, religious or educational purposes."'  It would have re-
quired vision to posit in 1894, or even in 1913,57 that non-
profit hospitals should be granted an exemption premised on a
societal benefit not necessary related either to charity or re-
ligion.
51. [The] Home For Worthy, Aged, Indigent, Colored People opened in New York in 1842,
funded by charitable donations. In 1882, it became the Colored Home and Hospital. Subsequently,
it began admitting white people, and in 1902, its name was changed to the Lincoln Hospital and
Home. In 1925, it became a municipal hospital "providing acute care to the poor of all
descriptions." STARR, supra note 32, at 158.
52. See id. at 173-74.
53. See id. at 175.
54. Seeid.atl7l.
55. See Rev. Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. The U.S. Supreme Court declared
portions of the tax law to be unconstitutional, and the Act did not become effective. It was
reenacted in 1913, by the Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § H(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 166-81.
56. Rev. Actof 1894, ch. 349, § 32,28 Stat. 556.
57. See id.
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B. The Service, Hospitals, and the Federal Tax Exemption
Early case law concerning hospitals and the tax exemption
demonstrates "a struggle to rationalize an exemption to apply
to a rapidly developing institution... reflect[ing] the IRS' and
courts' struggles with the growing pains of a slowly maturing
institution."' Many of these cases "focused more on a phy-
sician's or medical group's relationship to a small hospital than
on establishing any meaningful, affirmative requirements for
exemption."59 These cases raised issues about private benefit
and inurement with which we still grapple today. One Court,
however, Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanitarium v. Wil-
son,60 considered what a charitable institution owes the public.
The state of Arizona had acted to revoke a hospital's tax ex-
emption because the hospital had not rendered sufficient chari-
ty care. The Court upheld the hospital's exemption, finding that
"the position that the test of a charitable institution is the ex-
tent of the free services rendered... is difficult of application
and unsound in theory."61 The Southern Methodist Court artic-
ulated a test for defining a charitable institution, concluding
that a hospital whose purpose:
[I]s recognized in law as charitable, and... is not maintained
58. Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital,
32 ST. Loins U. LJ. 1015, 1038 (1988). See, e.g., Income Tax Ruling 2421, VU-2 C.B. 150
(1928) (denying tax-exempt status to a corporation organized and operated exclusively by a
physician, based upon the court's skepticism that the corporation was formed for any purpose
other than to obtain capital through deductible charitable contributions); Commissioner v. Battle
Creek Inc., 126 F.2d 405, 405 (5th Cir. 1942) (upholding tax exemption of sanitarium, although
its articles of incorporation authorized it to "conduct any other lawful business," in violation of
section 501(c)(3)'s requirement that an exempt organization be organized and operated
exclusively in pursuit of the exempt purpose); Goldsby King Mem'l Hosp. v. Commissioner, 3
T.C.M. (CCH) 693, 694, 697 (1944) (upholding the exemption of a 72-bed hospital, reasoning
that "organization for such exclusively charitable purposes is not precluded by the fact that
petitioner's charter authorized it to engage in all businesses that would be usual and profitable in
the operation of a hospital"); Davis Hosp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 312, 315
(1945) (upholding the exemption of a hospital which, prior to incorporation as a nonprofit, had
been run as a for-profit hospital, and, when incorporated as a nonprofit, charged patients who were
financially able to pay).
Douglas Mancino argues that since the litigated cases involve not large urban hospitals,
but only small hospitals with low bed counts, in expanding areas of the country, "there was very
little concern regarding the criteria generally applicable to 'established' nonprofit hospitals in the
more urban midwest, east, and northeast." Mancino, supra, at 1040.
59. Mancino, supra note 58, at 1039.
60. 77 P.2d 458,462 (Ariz. 1938).
61. Id.
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for the private gain... of its organizers .... directly or indi-
rectly .... [may be] properly characterized as ... charita-
ble..., notwithstanding the fact that it charges for most, if not
all, of the services which it may render, so long as its receipts
are devoted to the necessary maintenance of the institution and
the carrying out of the purpose for which it was organized.62
The Service did not adopt the Southern Methodist standard
for hospitals. In 1956, the Service released Revenue Ruling 56-
185, which set forth, for the first time, the criteria that non-
profit hospitals had to satisfy in order to establish themselves
as exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.63 Revenue Ruling 56-185 established an organizational
test for hospitals, requiring that exempt hospitals "be organized
as a nonprofit charitable organization for the purpose of operat-
ing a hospital for the care of the sick.' "64 Further, it included
an open staff provision, mandating that exempt hospitals not
restrict use of their facilities to particular groups of physicians
or surgeons, to the exclusion of other qualified physicians.
Paralleling statutory language of section 501(c)(3) regarding
private inurement and private benefit, the ruling forbade "net
earnings to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual."' Finally, it adopted the fi-
nancial ability standard, requiring that an exempt hospital be
"operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able
to pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for those
who are able and expected to pay." An exempt hospital
could no longer "refuse to accept patients in need of hospital
care who cannot pay for such services." Bad debts would
not count toward the provision of charity care; if full payment
for services was expected, a hospital would not be deemed to
"dispense charity merely because some of its patients fail to
62. Id.
63. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (modified by Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B.
117).
64. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (defining a corporation organized
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes as one whose articles of incorporation limit the pur-
pose of the corporation to the exempt purpose or purposes, and do not empower the corporation to
engage in activities not in furtherance of the exempt purpose or purposes).





pay for the services rendered." By requiring exempt hospi-
tals to act as charitable institutions, Revenue Ruling 56-185
"embrac[ed] the relief of poverty theory of exemption ...
consistent with the then-applicable definition of charitable con-
tained in the pre-1959 Treasury regulations." s
As the Southern Methodist Court predicted twenty years
earlier, the financial ability standard proved more difficult to
implement than to describe, since the inquiry was factual in
nature, 0 and "created potential conflicts between the judg-
ments of revenue agents and those of hospital [admin-
istrators]."71 As a result, "some hospitals were in danger of
losing their tax-exempt status because they failed to provide
sufficient levels of free or below cost care." '72
The administrative difficulties associated with the
application of the financial ability test were growing, and non-
profit hospitals sought a means by which they would be treated
as tax exempt per se. Several attempts were made to legisla-
tively recognize hospitals as exempt per se, but were unsuc-
cessful.73 The creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 had
a fundamental effect on hospitals, in that "[a] substantial por-
tion of the free care previously subsidized by tax-exempt hos-
pitals [under Revenue Ruling 56-185] now was reimbursed
through these programs."74 The Service came to recognize that
the concept of charity was evolving, and that its own definition
of charity was too narrow.75 Medicare and Medicaid, as well
as improvements in medical technology, wrought fundamental
changes in the hospital, taking it "from an almshouse to a
68. Il
69. Mancino, supra note 58, at 1041.
70. See id. at 1046 (observing that the financial ability test entailed an analysis of a
hospital's charity care policies, its bad debts, charity care, contractual allowances, allowances for
capital expenditures, medical education and research, and community health programs).
71. ROBERT R. BROMBERG, 1 TAX PLANNING FOR HosPrr As AND HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS § 7.26-7.27 (1977).
72. Mancino, supra note 58, at 1041.
73. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 413,91st Cong. (1969) (proposing that hospitals that otherwise
meet the requirements set forth in section 501(c)(3) be deemed exempt, even though they do not
fulfill the financial ability test of Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202).
74. HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 20, at § 3.02[1][c] 3-7 & 3-8 (describing the change
from reimbursement for free care by tax-exempt hospitals to reimbursement through Medicare
and Medicaid).
75. See MARY Jo SALINAS ET AL., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL DIvISION,
INTERNAL REVENUE SviWcE, EVOLUTnON OF THE HEALTH CARE FIELD 157,158-59 (1992).
396 [Vol. 7:381
NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND 501(C)(3)
modem [medical center],... warrant[ing] a change in the
rationale for a hospital's tax exempt status."76 Hence, in 1969,
the Service promulgated Revenue Ruling 69-545.'
Revenue Ruling 69-545 announced a change in the ratio-
nale for hospitals' exempt status. Citing the general law of
charity,78 Revenue Ruling 69-545 recognized:
[The promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the
advancement of education and religion, is one of the purpos-
es ... that is deemed beneficial to the community as a whole
even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct
benefit from its activities does not include all members of the
community, such as indigent members of the community, pro-
vided that the class is not so small that its relief is not of bene-
fit to the community.79
Thus, Revenue Ruling 69-545 set in motion the shift from the
charity care standard set by the financial ability test to the
community care standard, in "recognition of the fact that hospi-
tals were designed and operated to serve all classes of society,
not only the sick poor."'8
Revenue Ruling 69-545 compared two hospitals, only one
of which qualified for an exemption. The most important fac-
tors the Service articulated in finding that the first hospital
qualified for exemption were the following:
1. Whether the hospital is governed by a board of trustees com-
posed of prominent citizens in the community."1
2. Whether medical staff privileges are available to all qualified
physicians in the area, consistent with the size and nature of itsfacilities.'2
3. Whether the hospital provides care to all those in the com-
munity who could pay, either by themselves or through private
76. Mancino, supra note 58, at 1043. See also BROMBERG, Supra note 71, at 7-17 to 7-26.
77. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (explaining the rationale for hospitals' tax exempt
status).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 368, 372 (1957) (defining the nature of
charitable purposes and actions).
79. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
80. Mancino, supra note 58, at 1048.
81. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. In late 1996, the IRS released its Continuing
Professional Education Instruction Textbook for Exempt Organizations for Fiscal Year 1997.
Under this new text, the IRS relaxed its policy restricting physician participation on the board of
exempt hospitals. Physicians now may constitute a majority of the board of directors without
jeopardizing the hospital's exempt status, provided the hospital is controlled by a parent corpora-




health insurance or through a public program such as Medi-
care.
8 3
4. Whether the hospital operates a full time emergency room
treating all persons requiring emergency care, regardless of
ability to pay."
5. Whether transactions between the hospital and members of
its medical staff are conducted at arms' length and reflected fair
market value.
6. Whether the hospital applies its surplus of receipts over dis-
bursements to improvements in patient care; medical training,
education, and research; expansion and repair of facilities; and
amortization of indebtedness.
Shortly after Revenue Ruling 69-545 was introduced, it
was challenged by health and welfare advocates as well as
several private individuals. In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Association v. Simon,"' the Court of Appeals, reversing the
District Court's holding that Congress intended to restrict the
term charitable to its narrow sense of relief of the poor," held
that the term charitable as used in section 501(c)(3) was capa-
ble of a broader definition.87 The Court stated that:
[Although] in the past Congress and the federal courts have
conditioned a hospital's charitable status on the level of free or
below cost care that it provided for indigents, there is no au-
thority for the conclusion that the determination of 'charitable'
status was always to be so limited. Such an inflexible construc-
tion fails to recognize the changing economic, social and tech-
nological precepts and values of contemporary society .... .'
The Court concluded that Revenue Ruling 69-545 did not over-
rule Revenue Ruling 56-185. Instead, it afforded an alternative
83. Although Medicaid was not mentioned in this regard, the Service applies this condition
equally to Medicaid. See HiLL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 20, at § 3.02[l][c] 3-8 (citing SAUNAS
Er AL., supra note 75, at 157, 159).
84. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 which states the following:
[B]y operating an emergency room open to all persons and by providing hospital care
for all those persons in the community able to pay the cost thereof either directly or
through third party reimbursement, [an exempt hospital] is promoting the health of a
class of persons that is broad enough to benefit the community.
Id. at 118.
85. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
86. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org. v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp 325,338 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding
that Revenue Ruling 69-545 was improperly promulgated and is without effect).
87. Simon, 506 F.2d at 1287.
88. Id. at 1287-88.
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method whereby a hospital could qualify for exemption as a
charitable institution."
Specialty hospitals, however, such as cancer institutions or
children's hospitals, raised questions about Revenue Ruling 69-
545's applicability to themselves. Children's hospitals rarely, if
ever, involved Medicare patients; eye and ear hospitals rarely
involved emergency situations, and consequently, such hospi-
tals often did not have emergency rooms. The Service released
Revenue Ruling 83-157," which further relaxed the obligation
of hospitals. It extended exempt status to specialized hospitals
offering care for special conditions unlikely to require emer-
gency treatment, thus having no emergency facilities.91 Reve-
nue Ruling 83-157 has been interpreted to mean that
"participation in Medicare and similar programs, as well as the
operation of an open emergency room, were not absolute re-
quirements of exemption, but merely illustrated the types of
activities that would evidence the existence of sufficient com-
munity benefit to warrant tax-exempt status."'  The Service,
however, has not endorsed this interpretation. It maintains that
"Revenue Ruling 83-157 should not be interpreted to suggest
that operation of a full-time emergency room open to all re-
gardless of ability to pay is not a requirement for exemption,
but is merely illustrative of the types of activities that demon-
strate community benefit."'93 The Service goes on to depict the
89. See id. at 1289.
90. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
91. The Ruling stated:
[Clertain specialized hospitals, such as eye... and cancer hospitals, offer medical care
limited to special conditions unlikely to necessitate emergency care and do not, as a
practical matter, maintain emergency rooms. These organizations may also qualify
under section 501 (c)(3) if there are present similar, significant factors that demonstrate
that the hospitals operate exclusively to benefit the community.
Id. at 95. Furthermore, Revenue Ruling 83-157 announced that operation of an emergency room
was not an absolute requirement in cases where a state planning agency made an independent
determination that the emergency services would be duplicative and unnecessary. Id. at 94. As of
1996, Judith E. Kindell, of the Exempt Organizations Branch of the Internal Revenue Services,
repeated that no state agency had eve made such a determination. (Personal communication with
author).
92. Mancino, supra note 58, at 1048.
93. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTRODUCTION TO THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 216
(1995). In testimony before the House Select Committee on Aging, the Service explained that the
operation of an emergency room and participation in Medicare and Medicaid are the two most
important factors demonstrating community benefit. See Hospital Charity Care and Tax Exempt
Status: Restoring the Commitment and Fairness Before the House Select Committee on Aging,
101st Cong. 58 (1990) (statement of James J. McGovern, Assistant Chief Counsel, Employment
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operation of a full-time emergency room open to all regardless
of ability to pay as a "virtual requirement to demonstrate com-
munity benefit."94
C. Congressional Initiatives
Despite the Service's view, by 1990, there were growing
concerns that nonprofit hospitals, in response to increasing
pressure to control costs, were not delivering sufficient medical
care to the indigent. In 1989, Representative Brian Donnelly
(D-MA), introduced a bill linking a specified level of charita-
ble care to the availability of tax-exemption.95 The Donelly
bill was not enacted, but it sparked interest. Representative
Edward R. Roybal (D-CA), then Chairman of the House Select
Committee on Aging, held a hearing on June 28, 1990 to ex-
plore the amount and type of charity care provided by hospitals
and the type of legislation needed to ensure that exempt hospi-
tals shoulder their share of burdens."'  At that meeting, a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report,' commissioned by
Representative Roybal, was released. The report found that
"the link between tax-exempt status and the provision of
charitable activities for the poor or underserved is weak for
many nonprofit hospitals,"" and recommended that "[t]o the
extent that one of the goals of the tax exemption is to continue
or expand current levels of charity care and other services to
the poor in an increasingly competitive hospital environment,
changes in tax policy may be needed.""
In response, Representative Roybal introduced the Charity
Benefits and Exempt Organizations, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service).
94. James J. McGovern, McGovern Reviews Hospital Developments Leading to July 10
Ways and Means Hearing, 4 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 446, 446-48 (1991) (transcribing the
remarks of James J. McGovern, Assistant Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt
Organizations) to a Joint Assembly of the Canadian and U.S. Health Associations).
95. See H.R. 2207, 101st. Cong. (1989) (providing that hospitals that provide insufficient
service to low-income individuals would be subject to a 150 million dollar limitation on
outstanding bonds).
96. HILL & KniscfrEN, supra note 20, at § 3.02[1][e] 3-11 (describing Representative
Roybal's efforts to ensure that tax-exempt hospitals bear their share of the burdens of providing
charity care).
97. GAO/H.R. Doc. 90-84, supra note 21, at 12 (recording the General Accounting Of-
fice's Report to the Chairman, Select Committee on Aging, and House of Representatives).
98. Id. at 44.
99. Id
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Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act of 1990."°
Representative Roybal intended, not to eliminate the tax-ex-
empt status of hospitals, but to redirect the use of the exemp-
tion for the benefit of the indigent and near-indigent.' The
Charity Care Act proposed a substantive test for hospitals to
meet in order to obtain and keep their exemption. In addition
to satisfying the requirements of section 501(c)(3), hospitals
would have to serve a reasonable number of Medicare and
Medicaid patients in a nondiscriminatory manner, and would
have to provide, in an equally nondiscriminatory manner, am-
ple qualified charity care and qualified community benefits. To
satisfy the qualified charity care requirement, a hospital would
have to expend fifty percent or more of the value of the
hospital's tax exemption for the tax year on unreimbursed
charity care. Charity care was defined to include bad debt ex-
penses, care to indigents or near-indigents, costs in excess of
Medicaid reimbursements, and if the community had too few
charity patients requiring charity hospital care, the costs associ-
ated with providing health services designed to improve the
health of underserved members of the community. To satisfy
the qualified community benefit condition, a hospital would
have to expend thirty-five percent of the value of its exemption
on qualified community benefits. Such benefits would include
charity care costs exceeding the amount required under the
qualified charity care arm of the test, or those uncompensated
and not ordinarily provided by nonexempt hospitals. The bill
defined the value of the exemption as the "national target per-
centage" of the hospital's gross revenues for the tax year, as
follows:
[Tihe percentage estimated by the [Service] which, when ap-
plied to the estimated average gross receipts of tax exempt
hospitals in the United States for such taxable years, will yield
an amount equal to the average Federal, State, and local tax
revenues which are foregone by reason of their exempt sta-
100. Hospital Charity Care Act, H.R. 5686, 101st Cong. (1990), reintroduced the following
year as H.R. 790, 102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter Charity Care Act].
101. See 136 CoNG. REC. E2949-01 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1990). Representative Roybal
remarked that "[w]ith the value ... of hospital ... tax-exempt status estimated at over $8 billion
annually, we must once again target this vital federal resource at providing hospital care to unin-






Essentially, this meant that "the IRS would pick a num-
ber. 1 0
3
Soon thereafter, Representative Donnelly introduced a bill
under which a hospital would be denied exemption from feder-
al income tax if a substantial portion of its activities was in-
volved in operating a "nonqualified hospital."' ' "° A qualified
hospital was one which provided emergency services to all
regardless of ability to pay, 5 treated Medicaid patients, and
met one of five community benefit standards. Tests under the
community benefit standard included treating a disproportionate
share of low income Medicaid or Medicare patients; being a
sole community hospital, as defined by Medicare; expending at
least five percent"°6 of gross revenues to provide charity
care;' and expending at least ten percent of gross revenues
to provide outpatient clinics in medically underserved ar-
eas.10 8
These bills were considered on July 10, 1991, during the
House Ways and Means Committee hearings to review the tax-
exempt status of nonprofit hospitals, at which time a Treasury
Department Assistant Secretary presented the Bush
Administration's preference for the community benefit stan-
dard." No action was taken on either legislative proposal.
102. Charity Care Act, supra, note 100.
103. Richard Bove, When Should a Hospital be Treated as a Charity?, 3 J. TAX'N. EXEMPT
ORG. 10, 12 (1991) (commenting on the valuation of a hospital's exemption).
104. See H.R. 1374, 102d Cong. (1991) (requiring hospitals to provide certain emergency
medical care in order to be exempt from income tax).
105. This condition adhered closely to the spirit of Rev. Rul. 83-157, in that the requirement
to provide emergency care would not be applicable if the appropriate state agency determined that
operating an emergency room would be unnecessary or duplicative, or if the nature of the hospital
is such that, because of its specialty, it does not operate an emergency room and is not paid under
Medicare's prospective payment system.
106. Unlike the Roybal bill, the Donnelly bill sought to merge the charitable benefit
standard with that of community benefit. The five percent target Donnelly utilized harkens back to
Rev. Rul. 56-185, under which Internal Revenue Service agents determined the sufficiency of
hospitals' charitable care against a five percent target amount. See Hospital Charity Care and Tax
Exempt Status, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Aging, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63
(1990) (statement of James J. McGovern, Internal Revenue Service Associate Chief Counsel).
107. For purposes of the Donnelly bill, charity care was defined as excluding bad debts.
108. See H.R. 1374, 102d Cong. (1991) (stating the requirements that are necessary for
classification as a qualified hospital under the proposed bill).:
109. Michael Graetz, the Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, said that the
"community benefit standard is a more appropriate standard for evaluating the tax-exempt status
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In 1994, Representative Richard Gephardt, (D-MO), pro-
posed an amendment to section 501(c)(3), as part of the
Clinton Health Plan. He introduced section 501(n), adding a
new exemption requirement that called for a community plan-
ning process, whereby tax-exempt healthcare organizations
would be required to conduct annual assessments of the
community's needs for healthcare and outreach services, and to
develop a written plan stating how the organization would meet
those needs. Like the rest of the Clinton Health Care Plan, it
died on the vine. However, the question of indigent care and
hospital tax exempt status remains very much alive on a feder-
al, state, and municipal level.
D. State and Local Governments Lead the Way
Over the last ten years, state and local governments ac-
tively have challenged the exemption of hospitals."' Some
states have enacted legislation requiring hospitals to provide a
set amount of uncompensated care in order to qualify for ex-
emption from state and municipal taxes."' However, to date,
no consensus has emerged from the courts that might inform
the federal debate."' On the federal level, by 1991, the Ser-
of hospitals than the proposed charity-care standards" because it "recognizes the potential for a
variety of means" of expressing the charitable purpose of the institution. Tax Exempt Status of
Hospitals and Establishment of Charity Standards: Hearings on HR. 790 and HR. 1374 Before
the Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. (1991).
110. In at least twelve states, local officials have sought to end nonprofit hospitals'
charitable status and property tax exemption. Additionally, at least seventeen states have contem-
plated or enacted legislation to prevent unfair competition, and some municipalities are
contemplating charging nonprofits a fee for the services they use. See GAOIH.R. DOC. 90-84,
supra note 21, at 16.
111. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.043 (West 1996) (stating that a
hospital must provide charity care in order to qualify as a charitable organization). This section
was enacted in response to the State Attorney General's attempt to force Houston's Methodist
Hospital to increase its provision of charity care. See State v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., No. 494212
(126th J. Dist., Travis Cty., Tex., filed Nov. 26, 1990). The effort may have motivated the state
legislature to enact a bill requiring nonprofit hospitals to meet one of several tests involving
minimum expenditures for charity care and community benefits. See Gary Taylor, Charity Begins
in Court? Hospital Sued in Novel Lawsuit, NAT'L. L., Feb. 18, 1991, at 3 (describing a lawsuit
brought by the Texas Attorney General against the nation's largest private non-profit hospital).
112. See, e.g., Rideout Hosp. Found., Inc. v. Yuba, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 149 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (upholding hospital's property tax exemption from challenge by municipality; holding that
a nonprofit hospital earning surplus revenue in excess of 10% could still qualify as charitable
under the State Revenue and Taxation Code as long as it was organized and operated for an
exempt purpose and operated under the nondistributional constraint); Callaway Community Hosp.
Ass'n. v. Craighead, 759 S.W.2d 253, 255, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding hospital's
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vice announced that it would "initiate coordinated examinations
of large hospitals utilizing the services of income tax agents,
exempt organization agents, computer audit specialists, and
members of the Office of Chief Counsel."1 13 The Service ex-
pected to strip as many hospitals of their exempt status in 1991
as had lost their exemption in the prior ten years." 4
MI. CRITIQUE
The effort to link charity care to hospitals' tax exemption
does not occur in a vacuum. Indeed, it occurs in an atmosphere
where government has set health-care policy on a course that is
antithetical to the provision of increased amounts of charity
care. The result of government actions has been to increase the
eligibility for exemption from ad valorem taxation, despite the fact that the hospital, operating at a
loss of approximately $700,000, allocated only 4.9% of its operating expense to services for
indigent patients); Erie Sch. Dist. v. Erie Hamot Med. Ctr., 602 A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
The court upheld the county board of assessment's determination that Hamot Medical Center was
not exempt from property taxes, finding that the hospital, although it would provide emergency
healthcare to individuals without regard to ability to pay, aggressively attempted to collect
payment from uncompensated care patients not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid. Although
the hospital provided emergency care, the court weighed heavily the fact that the hospital was
compelled to do so as a condition of its licensure, determining that if the hospital was compelled
to have an open emergency room by law, it could not be deemed to be performing this function
voluntarily or charitably. See also West Allegheny Hosp. v. Board Property Assessment, 455 A.2d
1170, 1171 (Pa. 1982) (holding that the hospital properly fell under the state statute conferring an
exemption on hospitals founded, endowed, and maintained by public and private charity,
notwithstanding that public and private charity covered only a small portion of the hospital's
costs, and that costs were passed along to the hospital's paying patients, whose fees covered
approximately 80% of the amounts billed); Downtown Hosp. Ass'n. v. Tennessee Bd. of
Equalization, 760 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Term. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding lower court's reversal of a
state board of equalization's determination that the nonprofit hospital was not entitled to
exemption because the hospital received "substantial" payment for its services); Arkansas Hosp.,
Inc. v. Arkansas Pass Indep. Sch. Dist., 521 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (finding that
the hospital was not charitable in operation where only 1.9% of its admissions in a five year
period were charitable cases); Utah Bd. of Equalization v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709
P.2d 265, 265 (Utah 1985) (upholding board of equalization's withdrawal of exemption, arguing
that exempt status requires a sufficient measure of charity care, reflecting the view that healthcare
delivery is not per se a charitable enterprise); Medical Ctr. Hosp., Inc. v. Burlington, 566 A.2d
1352, 1352 (Vt. 1989) (holding the hospital to be exempt from property taxation, although the
hospital did not dispense an amount of free care in excess of the amount of care it gave to the
paying public, nor did it derive its funds mainly from public and private charity).
A number of other hospitals, in exemption challenges from their states, have agreed to pay
settlements in order to prevent revocation of the exemption. See David Burda, Pa. Files More
Challenges to Tax Exemptions, MOD. HEALTHCmE, Feb. 18, 1991, at 2; Michele L. Robinson,
Via Donation or Tax, Cities Want More Revenues, Hosp., Mar. 20, 1989, at 55.
113. Bove, supra note 103, at 11 (describing IRS' actions to initiate coordinated
examinations at large hospitals).
114. Seeid.
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numbers of uninsureds or underinsureds while decreasing the
reimbursements to hospitals.
Perhaps the trend away from charity and toward commer-
cialism began even before government enactments. As the
hospital evolved into a medical institution controlled by physi-
cians, it became not "a well of sorrow and charity but a work-
place of the production of health.'. 15 But the government has
become a vast shaper of medical policy and is largely respon-
sible for having created the conditions under which nonprofit
hospitals render less uncompensated care than some would
like. 116
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid unleashed forces
that had a great impact on nonprofit hospitals. As the govern-
ment became an important third-party payor of medical servic-
es, hospitals moved "toward becoming... commercial non-
profits - organizations that generate most of their revenues
from the sale of services rather than from charitable dona-
tions.'. 7 Indeed, donations currently equal less than five per-
cent of hospitals' revenues,"' due both to the size of the rev-
enue, and to the belief that hospitals are less in need of dona-
tions in an era of third-party payors and government pro-
115. STARR, supra note 32, at 146.
116. In Congress' major effort to eliminate the barriers to employment, transportation, and
public services faced by the disabled, it specifically omitted one major barrier - the preexisting
condition barrier to obtaining medical insurance. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
provides that no portion of the Act shall be "construed to prohibit or restrict... an insurer,
hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that
administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law. 42 U.S.C. §
12201(c)(1) (1993) [hereinafter ADA].
In April 1996, the House (H.R. 3063) and Senate (S. 1698) each passed a version of the
Health Insurance Reform Act of 1996. This Act was proposed by Senators Kennedy (D-MA) and
Kassenbaum (R-KS) and won committee approval. However, several conservative Republican
senators, opposing the measure, utilized an arcane procedural device, a "hold," to anonymously
delay action. Only when the media attention created adverse publicity was this bill brought before
the House and Senate for a vote. See Bowermaster & Auster, supra note 21, at 23. The Health
Insurance Reform Act became the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and was
passed in August, 1996. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996). This legislation prevents insurers from denying
coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions. Insurers will still be able to impose up to
twelve month waiting periods before having to pay for medical treatment associated with the
preexisting condition. See id. However, future insurers will not be able to exclude coverage for the
same condition. See Bowermaster & Auster, supra note 21, at 23-24.
117. Bradford H. Gray, Why Nonprofits? Hospitals and the Future of American Health






Medicare had an even greater influence, because it includ-
ed reimbursement for capital expenses. Prior to the advent of
Medicare, the Hill-Burton program" provided for hospitals'
capital needs, in exchange for provision of uncompensated
care. 2 ' But in the 1960s, the Hill-Burton program was being
phased out, requiring hospitals to develop their own funding
sources. Unlike the for-profits, which could raise funds through
shareholders, nonprofits were, by the terms of section
501(c)(3), under a nondistributional constraint. Therefore, the
nonprofits had no shareholders from whom to obtain funding.
Medicare's capital expense reimbursement program made it
possible for hospitals to go to the debt market to replace funds
they could no longer get through Hill-Burton and could not get
in sufficient quantity through charitable contributions or
through fees charged for services. But the debt market is less
generous than Congress. It demands that "hospitals' credit
worthiness be subject to careful evaluation and ranking on the
scale used for bond rating."'" Questionable credit worthiness
would result in lower bond ratings and higher interest costs.
Financially weak hospitals were foreclosed from the debt mar-
ket by virtue of their poor balance sheets. So it was important
for hospitals to present a "good" bottom line in order to obtain
funds. While "[e]valuations of credit worthiness depend on
many factors ... there is a negative correlation with such
119. See generally LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFrT SECTOR (1992).
120. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1964) [hereinafter Hill-
Burton]. The Hill-Burton Act forged an alliance between federal and state governments, whereby
federal money was allocated to the states according to a formula based on relative population and
per capita income. From 1947 to 1974, the Hill-Burton program built forty percent of the beds in
6,000 of the country's nonprofit and public hospitals, costing four billion dollars in federal grants
and loans, and $10.4 billion more in state and local matching funds. See Milligan, supra note 23,
at 12-13 (explaining the role of the Hill-Burton Act as it relates to federal and state governments).
121. Although Hill-Burton funds were distributed with the proviso that accepting hospitals
provide a reasonable amount of free care to indigents, its mission has not always been marked
with success. Compliance was tenuous at best, with hospitals having to be forced by legal action
to render indigent care. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 181 (7th Cir.
1983) (interpreting Hill-Burton's uncompensated care obligation to require that, for a period of
twenty years after receiving Hill-Burton funds, hospitals must annually provide a prescribed
amount of free or reduced-rate care to indigent patients), cert denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984). See
also 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 90-92 (1983) (commenting
on how the ability to pay influences accessibility to healthcare services).
122. Gray, supra note 117, at733.
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factors as amount of bad debt and serving large numbers of
Medicaid and Medicare patients."'" Access to capital is criti-
cal in the healthcare industry, which is "capital-intensive due to
the competition between hospitals to have the most modem
facilities and the latest technology."' 24 Foreclosure from the
capital market could be detrimental to the future of a hospital.
Thus, nonprofit hospitals were encouraged to minimize uncom-
pensated care in order to gain access to the capital necessary
for survival.
Medicare's prospective payment system revised the origi-
nal terms of the Medicare program wherein reimbursement for
hospital services was made on a reasonable cost basis. Given
the dramatic rise in healthcare costs, jeopardizing the fiscal
stability of the Medicare program, the prospective payment
system reimbursed hospitals a set amount based upon the
patient's diagnostic related grouping (DRG). The prospective
payment system encouraged hospitals to become efficient, by
virtue of its rationale that efficient hospitals could keep the dif-
ference between what Medicare reimbursed and what it actual-
ly cost the hospital to provide the care. This "led to immediate
interest in hospitals' profitability,"'" an interest inimical to
rendering vast amounts of uncompensated care.
The government has also influenced hospital behavior with
respect to its manipulation of the Medicaid program. Unlike
the Medicare program, which is federal, "Medicaid is a cooper-
ative federal-state program through which the Federal Govern-
ment provides financial assistance to States" for the provision
of indigent medical care."2 But Medicaid has "failed to up-
hold the promise it offered,"'2 7 because states have "enjoy[ed]
wide latitude in designing the specific eligibility requirements
that will apply within their boundaries; being poor in and of
itself is not enough."'" Further, state-set reimbursement rates
are precipitously low, creating an economic barrier for Medic-
123. Id.
124. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 54.
125. Gray, supra note 117, at733.
126. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n., 496 U.S. 498, 501 (1990) (challenging
administration of the state's Medicaid program).
127. Milligan, supra note 23, at 14.
128. Id. (citing Georgia's policy of denying coverage to families where both parents are in
the home).
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aid recipients when seeking medical care. Partially as a result
of low reimbursement, few physicians are willing to treat Med-
icaid patients.129 Some healthcare providers have challenged
unreasonable reimbursement rates. In one such challenge, Wild-
er v. Virginia Hospital Association," a nonprofit corporation
of public and private hospitals filed suit, contending that the
state's reimbursement plan violated the Boren Amendment."'
The Boren Amendment required the state to set rates:
[That it] finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secre-
tary .... [are] reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which
must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facil-
ities in order to provide care and services in conformity with
applicable State and Federal laws, and to assure that individuals
eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access ... to
inpatient hospital services of adequate quality.132
The Court held that the language of the statute that gives states
the obligation to set reimbursement levels is not satisfied by
setting an arbitrary rate determined by budget considerations.
Rather than increase the overall budget for indigent medical
care, states have responded by limiting eligibility. Further,
since Medicaid rates are set on a different scale than are those
for Medicare, Medicaid rates remain well below those set for
Medicare.
In addition, the modem healthcare landscape itself is hos-
tile to increasing levels of charity care. Gunshot and knife
wounds, AIDS, and illicit drug use have created an increased
129. See id (stating that "twenty percent of all physicians have no Medicaid patients at all,
and just six percent of all doctors care for one-third of all Medicaid patients").
130. See 496 U.S. at 498 (noting that the Boren Amendment creates a substantive federal
"right').
131. See Pub. L. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (changing the standard reimbursement of
nursing and intermediate care facilities when Congress enacted the Boren Amendment).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1988). When Medicaid was originally
adopted, the Act provided for reimbursement based upon the reasonable cost of services actually
performed. In 1972, the Act was amended in order to provide states with additional flexibility to
develop standards for reimbursement, although Congress retained the requirement that states
reimburse on a 'reasonable cost' basis for inpatient hospital services provided. See Social Security
Act of 1972 § 232(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (1972). Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, however, "had essentially forced states to adopt Medicaid rates based
on Medicare 'reasonable cost' principles." Wilder, 496 U.S. at 506. Thus, in response to swiftly
climbing Medicaid costs, Congress extended the Boren Amendment to hospitals in 1981, giving
states greater flexibility to implement different reimbursement methodologies. The Boren Amend-
ment changed the "reasonable cost basis" reimbursement provision to "reasonable and adequate"
language. In so doing, Medicaid reimbursements would he smaller than those for Medicare.
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demand for intensive hospital services, which in turn has
placed "a new cost squeeze on hospitals."'' Gunshot vio-
lence alone now adds approximately 4.5 billion dollars per year
to healthcare expenditures." 4 It is more expensive to treat
than are other forms of violence. In 1992, an average stab
wound would cost approximately $6,446 to treat, while an
average gunshot case cost $14,541.' For a gunshot into the
spinal cord, the costs dramatically increase. In 1992, the Na-
tional Spinal Cord Injury Statistical Center estimated the first
year's medical costs of a gunshot wound to the upper cervical
vertebra to be approximately $417,067, plus $74,707 each
succeeding year. 6 For a gunshot wound to the lower spinal
column, first year costs were estimated at $152,395, plus
$15,507 for each year thereafter.137 Spinal cord gunshot inju-
ries are now so common that "some healthcare providers sus-
pect gunmen are deliberately aiming for the neck.' 3'  Ap-
proximately seventy-five percent of all spinal cord gunshot
victims are under thirty years of age,139 portending "many
costly years ahead."'" But who bears these costs? Eighty
percent of gunshot victims are either Medicaid recipients or are
uninsured.4 1 Traditionally, hospitals have shifted the costs of
treating uninsureds and underinsureds onto the bills of paying
patients. But both HMOs and traditional fee-for-service insur-
ers have become more cost sensitive, making it difficult for
hospitals to "pawn off on anyone the costs of the
uninsureds. ' 4 z Hospitals have responded to this cost squeeze
by closing sixty urban trauma centers within the past ten years,
leaving "less than one quarter of the nation's population resid-
133. Bove, supra note 103, at 11 (describing the impact of intensive hospital care). See
also EUGENE RICHARDs, THE KNIFE AND GUN CLUB: SCENES FROM AN EMERGENCY RooM
(1989); GAO/H.R. Doc. 90-84, supra note 21, at 14-15.
134. See Susan Headden, Guns, Money & Medicine, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Jul. 1,








141. See id. at 31-32 (explaining why the public bears the cost of caring for gunshot
victims).
142. Id. at 37.
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ing anywhere near top flight trauma care."143 These centers
all cited the "growing burden of [providing] uncompensated
services-millions of dollars of which resulted from treating
indigent victims of handgun violence."1
Further, there exist fundamental flaws in both the commu-
nity benefit standard, and the charity care standard as articulat-
ed in the recent legislative efforts.
If, as the Roybal, Donnelly, and Gephardt bills suggest,
the exemption is linked to the requirement that exempt hos-
pitals render charity care, then the exemption, regardless of
what tax theorists will argue,145 is a subsidy of one form or
another." And if the exemption is a subsidy given to pro-
mote indigent care, then why should nonprofits receive it if
for-profits, which also provide uncompensated care, do
not?147 Further, given that the tax exemption has been pre-
mised on its contribution to the promotion of pluralism by vir-
tue of the social innovations provided by exempt non-
profits," it would be a strange expression of pluralism to
condition the hospital exemption on only one expression, that
of charity care. This would render the exemption a mechanical
quid pro quo that would fail to recognize new methods of in-
creasing the community's health.
The community benefit standard, too, contains flaws which
render it mechanistic and archaic in an era where hospitals are
combining and healthcare is being delivered in ever growing
new forms.
Several indicia of community benefit, as articulated in
Revenue Ruling 69-545, are duplicative of the statutory lan-
guage in section 501(c)(3). Revenue Ruling 69-545's require-
ments that the hospital be governed by prominent community
143. ld.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 9.
146. And in fairness, Congress, hospitals, and tax planners do assume it to be a subsidy. But
calling it a subsidy does not in turn decide what that subsidy is or should be about when applied to
hospitals.
147. See, e.g., John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax-Exemption for Non-
profit Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 16 (1992) [hereinafter
Tax-Exemption].
148. See SALAMON, supra note 119, at 9 (explaining that tax exemption for nonprofits is
premised, in part, on the role they play in freedom and pluralism through encouraging initiatives
for the public good).
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citizens; that the hospital make medical staff privileges avail-
able to all qualified area physicians, space permitting; and, that
transactions between the hospital and members of its medical
staff be conducted at arms' length, reflecting fair market value,
all speak to the requirement under section 501(c)(3) that the
organization's assets not inure to the benefit of any private
party. They have nothing to do with community benefit direct-
ly, except that the community does benefit when an exempt
organization's funds are dedicated to the community, and not
passed to insiders.149 The requirement that the hospital apply
its surplus of receipts over disbursements to hospital improve-
ments is a straightforward ban against the distribution of ex-
empt assets to a private interest. So only two elements of the
community benefit test, the requirement that the hospital oper-
ate an open emergency room and that it provide care equally to
those who pay by themselves, through private third-party
payors, or through government programs like Medicare and
Medicaid, really speak to the direction of the hospital's assets
toward the community. But how relevant are they today?
Today, many hospital beds remain empty."s In an era of
increasing competition, and in a desire to generate cash flow,
hospitals are, if not courting Medicare and Medicaid recipients,
far more eager to have them. This is due to the government
payment that accompanies them,"' the theory being that a
small payment is better than none at all, which is what an
empty bed generates.
Finally, exempt hospitals are required to maintain an
emergency room open to all regardless of ability to pay. Emer-
gency departments, unlike physicians' offices, provide "24-hour
staff coverage and highly technical procedural capabilities." '
149. The term "insider" is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(ii) to include
"designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests." This definition is extremely broad,
encompassing many who are excluded from the definition of insiders under the body of corporate
law prohibiting "insider" trading.
150. Both the number of hospital beds, and the percentage of those beds occupied, fell from
1.7 million beds, of which 80% were occupied in 1965, to 1.2 million beds, of which 70% were
occupied in 1992. James Kunen, The New Hands-OffNursing, TMA, Sept. 30, 1996, at 57.
151. Finkelstein, supra note 48, at 48 (commenting on hospital dependence on government
reimbursement for medical care). See also, GAOIH.R. Doc. 90-84, supra note 21, at 12.
152. John S. Dickhudt et al., Emergency Room Use andAbuse: How it Varies With Payment
Mechanism, 70 MINN. MED. 571,571 (1987).
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Emergency department visits have been on the rise, increasing
by nineteen percent from 1985 to 1990, a year which marked
99.6 million visits. 153 Those visitors have included victims of
accidents, heart attacks, strokes, violence and drug abuse. The
emergency room also receives victims of poverty, the unin-
sured and underinsured. The poor come for urgent and
nonurgent care, for this is often the only place where care will
be dispensed without regard to their ability to pay. Between
1985 and 1990, emergency department visits by Medicaid
recipients increased by thirty-four percent.154 But is the emer-
gency department the most efficient place to provide primary
care for such ailments as headaches, sprains, or other symp-
toms best addressed by a primary care physician? 5 Some
research suggests that it is not.
One study,"s utilizing data from the 1987 National Med-
ical Expenditure Survey, 57 examined the ratio of emergency
department to nonemergency department costs for nonurgent
care."' The study, viewing approximately 2,100 visits to
153. See Robert M. Williams, The Costs of Visits to Emergency Departments, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 642, 642 (1996) (noting a 34% increase in visits by Medicaid patients, a 29%
increase by Medicare patients, and a 15% increase by uninsured patients).
154. See The Medicaid Access Study Group, Access of Medicaid Recipients to Outpatient
Care, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426, 1426 (1994) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: UNEVENLY AFFECTED BY GROWTH AND CHANGE IN PATIENT USE
93-4 (1993)).
155. It is likely that because the indigent cannot obtain access to private physicians, they
resort to the always available emergency room for routine medical treatment. Id. at 1428. See also
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: UNEVENLY AFFECTED BY GROWTH
AND CHANGE IN PATIENT USE 93-4 (1993) (stating the General Accounting Office identified the
absence of a primary physician as the chief reason people use hospital emergency departments for
minor medical problems); Judith S. Gavaler & David H. Van Thiel, The Non-Emergency in the
Emergency Room, 72 J. NAT'L. MED. ASS'N. 33, 33 (1980) (stating that "the urban poor, who very
often do not have a personal physician, use the hospital emergency room as a family physician, or
as a source of ongoing medical care"); Richard I. Haddy et al., Nonemergency Emergency Room
Use in Patients With and Without Primary Care Physicians, 24 J. FAM. PRAC. 389, 389, 392
(1987) (confirming the hypothesis that "patients who have personal physicians use emergency
services less often for non-emergency reasons," and concluding that if individuals had access to
personal physicians, "nonemergency emergency room use would decrease").
156. Laurence C. Baker & Linda Schurman Baker, Excess Cost of Emergency Department
Visits for Nonurgent Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1994, at 162, 169.
157. The National Medical Expenditure Survey is a national survey of approximately 35,000
people in 4,000 American households. Survey items address the use of healthcare services and
healthcare expenditures by individuals within the family, as well as the financing of these
expenditures.
158. Nonurgent conditions were defined in this study to include superficial injuries, sore
throats, diaper rash, eczema, corns, callouses, ingrown nails, conjunctivitis, earwax, hiccoughs,
heartburn, headaches and backaches, gastroenteritis, upper respiratory tract infections, and
[V/ol. 7:381
NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND 501(C)(3)
emergency departments and nonemergency departments, tested
the hypothesis that use of emergency services for nonurgent
situations is a source of excess healthcare expenditure. The
study found that charges for emergency department visits were
two to three times higher than those for visits in non-emer-
gency department settings.'59 Based upon estimates of the
total number of nonurgent cases being treated in an emergency
department setting, the study theorized that the excess cost of
such visits was five to seven billion dollars."
Another study reviewed medical record and billing infor-
mation for a sample of twenty thousand emergency department
visits in three Los Angeles, California hospitals deemed "rep-
resentative of large and medium-sized urban [emergency de-
partments] in which physician services were provided primarily
by full-time board-certified or board-prepared emergency phy-
sicians."'' Of the initial sample, approximately nine thousand
visits involved nonurgent conditions. The cost of providing
such care in an emergency department setting was found to be
almost twice the cost of its provision in a nonemergency de-
partment setting.'
A recent report published in the New England Journal of
Medicine challenged these findings. 63 This study examined
six Michigan community hospitals' emergency departments,
centering on the average and marginal costs of providing
care." Visits were classified as urgent, semiurgent, and non-
uncomplicated fractures of any digit or metacarpal. Baker & Baker, supra note 156, at 163.
159. See id. at 166-67. For all episodes, the difference between actual emergency
department charges and those projected in non-emergency department settings was $93.85, a ratio
of 2.882:1.
160. These figures were determined by assuming that 55.4% (approximately 50 million) of
1992 emergency department visits were nonurgent, and multiplying this number by the $93.85
differential in charges observed between emergency and non-emergency department costs. The
resulting number, $4.7 billion, was multiplied by the medical consumer price index (CPI), which
indicated 54.8% growth between 1987, the year in which the data from the National Medical
Expenditure Survey was obtained, and 1993, the year in which the study was prepared for
publication. The resulting number is $7.2 billion (1993 dollars). See id. at 169, 171.
161. Larry J. Baraff et al., Direct Costs of Emergency Medical Care: A Diagnosis-Based
Case-Mix Classification System, 20 ANN. EMERG. MED. 1, 2 (1991).
162. Seeid. at5.
163. See Williams, supra note 153, at 642-45 (indicating that the costs of nonurgent care in
emergency departments is considerably less than previous studies conclude).
164. Marginal cost was defined as the extra cost for one additional visit. For instance, the
cost for "squeezing in" a visit by a 12-year-old patient with acute asthma in a private physician's
office at 4 p.m. would be relatively small. See id. at 642. In contrast, the cost of seeing the same
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urgent.165 The study found that, contrary to widely held be-
lief,"6  "[t]he... costs of [providing] nonurgent care in the
emergency department are relatively low."167 However, the
study is flawed by the fact that it omitted hospitals located in
the Detroit metropolitan area. Detroit is a large urban center
whose problems of poverty, violence, and drug abuse require
that emergency departments be highly sophisticated. This in
turn calls for higher staffing, more intensive machinery, and
consequently, higher costs associated with the provision of
care.6  Thus, this study provides little in the way of infor-
mation that can be transferrable to large urban medical cen-
ters. 69 Further, even if the study's conclusion is transferable,
it suggests that there is some quantifiable cost to providing
nonurgent care in an emergency room setting in excess of that
associated with the provision of care in a primary care setting.
Further, "although the potential savings from a diversion of
nonurgent visits to private physicians' offices would be less
patient by the same physician at 4 a.m. would be relatively high, due to the expense and
inconvenience entailed in opening an office at a time when it is ordinarily closed. See id.
Conversely, a 4 a.m. visit to an emergency room would be highly convenient, because the
department is usually enjoying a slack period at that time, but, due to the nature of emergency
departments, the cost is high because the department is fully staffed. See id. at 642, 644.
165. Urgent visits were defined as ones requiring immediate attention in the emergency
department. It included patients who were admitted to the hospital, had conditions assigned
critical care codes, or required special treatment for such conditions as bums, lacerations requiring
sutures, fractures, or medical conditions requiring extensive evaluation in the emergency room.
See id. at 642. Semi-urgent visits were defined as ones involving moderately serious injuries or
medical conditions. Id Nonurgent conditions were defined as "minor medical problems, such as
acute pharyngitis, otitis media, upper respiratory tract infection, or first-degree bums." Id.
166. See id. at 642 & n.2 (referring to federal government findings that nonurgent visits to
emergency rooms by Medicare and Medicaid recipients cost considerably more than the same
visits to physicians' offices).
167. Id at 642 (arguing that the actual marginal costs of nonurgent care at hospital
emergency departments are far less than other studies suggest).
168. This cycle was recognized in a study by Robert M. Saywell, Jr. et al., An Analysis of
Reimbursement for Outpatient Medical Care in an Urban Hospital Emergency Department, 10
AM. J. EMERG. MEr. 8,12 (1992) (illustrating how the demand placed on hospitals because of the
"national trend of increasing [emergency department] visits," necessitates increased staffing
levels, thus increasing the emergency department's payroll, which in turn increases the cost of
providing care in an emergency department). See also Headden, supra note 134, at 36 (observing
that more than half of the victims of gunshot violence require costly emergency procedures, such
as laparotomies and thoracotomies).
169. Dr. Williams, the study's author, acknowledges that the study's hospitals were not
randomly selected, but rather, the emergency departments in the study "contracted with physicians
who used a common billing company," and that "[tihe results [of the study] may not be applicable
to other hospital settings or locations." Williams, supra note 153, at 644-45 (providing further
evidence that urgent care service is not a reliable standard for exempted status).
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than is widely believed," some savings would be effected.17 °
Another study, proceeding from the position that the
"[u]se of the emergency department for nonemergency care is
frequent and costly,.171 examined the effect of a copayment
on utilization of emergency department services. This study
followed 30,276 subjects who were members of the Northern
California Kaiser Permanente Plan, a group-model HMO. The
HMO introduced a copayment of $25 to $35 for the use of
emergency department services, payable by cash, check, or
credit card at the time the services were provided. The study
found a 14.5% reduction in the number of nonemergency vis-
its. 2  However, the reduction in emergency visits 73  was
deemed "small and not significant,"'7 resulting in no adverse
events as a consequence of the copayment.
Thus, even if, arguendo, we cannot reliably conclude that
the provision of nonemergency services in an emergency room
setting costs more per visit, there is reliable evidence that the
system pays more because absent responsibility for payment,
services may be utilized in excess of what is reasonably neces-
sary. And, if exempt healthcare dollars are inefficiently spent,
the expenditure does not benefit the community, any more than
does private inurement, which is barred by the statutory lan-
guage of section 501(c)(3). In short, the emergency care re-
quirement is not a sound basis on which to predicate tax-
exempt status.
IV. PROPOSAL
As the foregoing has suggested, both the charity care and
community benefit standards are flawed. They lack the flexi-
170. See id. at 642 (acknowledging that some cost savings would result from referring
nonurgent patients in hospital emergency rooms to doctors' offices).
171. Joe V. Selby et al., Effect of a Copayment on Use of the Emergency Department in a
Health Maintenance Organization, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 635,635 (1996).
172. The study defined nonemergency conditions to include musculoskeletal sprain, strain,
or pain, soft-tissue injury, vaginitis, wound infection, upper respiratory infection, cough,
constipation, nasopharyngitis, arthritis, and headache. See id. at 640.
173. The study defined emergency conditions to include cardiac arrest, ventricular
tachycardia or fibrillation, coma, myocardial infarction, respiratory failure, stroke, cerebral
aneurysm, congestive heart failure, poisoning, drug overdose, fracture, gunshot or knife wound.
See id.
174. Id. at 638.
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bility to capture the ways in which some exempt hospitals
provide benefit to the national community. For such hospitals,
termed here "meta-hospitals," this Note proposes to create a
categorical exemption, wherein the exempt hospitals would be
bound by the requirements of section 501(c)(3), including the
nondistributional constraint, but would not be bound by mech-
anistic yardsticks of community benefit.
Measuring community benefit in a more global setting is
an idea whose time has come. Forces of technology and busi-
ness are pushing medical information across the country into
areas where it had not gone before, and furthering the concept
of nation as community.17 As telemedicine continues to al-
low hospitals to "reach out and touch someone," '176 the some-
ones they are touching are often patients in rural communities,
for whom healthcare had previously been unavailable because
of the community's remote location.177
Indeed, nationalization of medicine is already recognized,
as the strict locality standard17 in malpractice has in many
jurisdictions given way to a national rule, 9 recognizing the
175. See Rhonda Bergman, Letting TelemedicineDo the Walking: Rural Project Uses Video
Communications to Enhance Access to Care, 67 HOSP. 46, 46 (1993) (quoting Scott Parisella, one
of the organizers of the Rural Health Networking Project of Western New York, who observed
that "[i]t is no longer the paradigm of transporting the expert knowledge worker, but transporting
the knowledge worker's expertise," which produces "immediate access to medical expertise no
matter where the patient is, and more timely diagnoses and treatment").
176. More than twenty states currently have telemedicine projects. See id. at 46-47
(reporting that an Austin, Texas nephrologist, who formerly had to travel three hours to visit his
dialysis patients in Giddings, a rural Texas community, now is "available to patients [in Giddings]
on a continuous basis").
177. Model Act Would Create Special Licenses For Physicians Practicing Telemedicine, 49
BNA HEALTH CARE POL'Y. REP., Dec. 11, 1995, at D-40 (noting that the impetus to developing
the Telemedicine Model Act was the interest in telemedicine, stemming from the "demand for
high quality healthcare irrespective of location").
178. The strict locality standard for examining the performance of physicians was
"developed to protect the rural and small town practitioner, who was presumed to be less ade-
quately informed and equipped than his big city brother." Shilkret v. Annapolis Emerg. Hosp.
Ass'n., 349 A.2d 245, 248 (Md. 1975). The standard recognized that "[i]n the smaller towns and
country, those who practice medicine ... do not enjoy... opportunities of daily observation and
practical operations, where the elementary studies are brought into every day use." Teffit v.
Wilcox, 6 Kan. 33, 43 (1870).
179. See, e.g., Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544,551 (La. Ct. App. 1962)
(determining that "[t]o relieve a member of the medical profession from liability for injury to a
patient on the ground that he followed a degree or standard of care practiced by others in the same
locality is... unthinkable when the ... standard of care in question is shown to constitute
negligence because it fails to meet the test of reasonable care and diligence required of the medi-
cal profession"); Shilkret, 349 A.2d at 245 (observing that "the development of the strict locality
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reality that medical school education, journals, cable programs,
continuing medical education seminars, and the advent of
telemedicine, allow healthcare providers throughout the country
to be educated with the latest information. Currently, computer
databases are providing instant information on advances in
medical knowledge irrespective of the physician's geographic
location. MEDLINE, the largest medical computer database, of-
fers more than "five million references and articles from 4,000
journals."'" Thus, in the realm of malpractice, the nation is
the community benefitting from research and discoveries per-
formed in localities far from that in which the medical treat-
ment at issue occurs.
By recognizing meta-hospitals as categorically exempt
from taxation, the Service would be doing no more than ac-
knowledging the reality of the national reach of these hospitals
currently. Even smaller hospitals are participating in research
that will yield benefits to the many. For example, multi-cen-
tered clinical trials allow a given hypothesis to be tested on a
large and diverse sample population. By testing on large and
diverse populations, results can be more reliably gen-
eralized.'
But it is the amount and importance of the research done
by these meta-hospitals that commends them for this special
tax treatment. Research patterns differ between for-profit and
not-for-profit hospitals, and between teaching and community
hospitals.' The importance of exempt hospitals' research can
rule a century ago was grounded in the manifest inequality existing in that day between physicians
practicing in large urban centers and those practicing in remote rural areas," and determining that
the rule could not be justified in light of the realities of modem medical practice, which made
"[n]ew techniques and discoveries.., available to all doctors within a short period of time
through medical journals, closed circuit television presentations... medical literature, and...
correspondence courses"); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973,977 (Wash. 1967) (holding that
"[n]egligence cannot be excused on the ground that others in the same locality practice the same
kind of negligence"). See also John Kimbrough Johnson, Jr., Comment, An Evaluation of Chan-
ges in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729, 732 (1970); Samuel J. Stoia, Case
Brief, Vergara v. Doan: Modern Medical Technology Consumes the Locality Rule, 2 J. PHARM. &
LAW 107, 107-12 (1993).
180. BARRY R. FuRRow Er AL, HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 240 (1995).
181. See Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, 1992
HASTINGS CrR. REP. 24, 24 (finding that "despite a 1986 federal policy to the contrary, women
[minorities and the elderly] continue to be seriously under-represented in biomedical research
study populations... [resulting] in significant gaps in... knowledge").
182. See, e.g., GAO/H.R. Doc. 90-84, supra note 21, at 39 (finding that exempt hospitals
engage in approximately twice as much scientific and clinical research as do investor-owned
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be seen through the paradigm of the disease model, AIDS. In
the early years of the epidemic, when research might have
yielded the information essential to informing the public about
conforming its behavior, neither government nor private funds
were being amply distributed to researchers interested in the
disease.' It was not until several years into the epidemic
that the federal government began to dedicate more substantial
sums for AIDS research.1  But hospitals, which faced the
beginning of the epidemic as the first patients entered their
doors, performed fundamental research. This research begins,
not with a grant proposal, a grant, an Institutional Review
Board's analysis, but with the anecdotal evidence borne of the
observation that one, then two, then another, then a group of
patients have a cluster of unusual symptoms. Such research,
funded by the hospitals themselves when the patients were
uninsured or underinsured, revealed information that greatly
benefitted the community, information without which a con-
taminated blood supply would have continued to be used for
transfusion purposes." 5 Because discrimination and cutbacks
in funding affect the rate at which research is undertaken,"
the value of the exemption can be expressed as providing fund-
ing for important research that might otherwise find no other
source of financial support.
Recognizing these special hospitals as categorically ex-
empt will not decrease access to healthcare. It is unlikely that
even one emergency room will close its doors as a result of the
adoption and application of this proposal. Whether efficient or
hospitals).
183. See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITCS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS
EPiDEMIC 91, 139, 144, 175, 190,214,232-33,235,283 (1987).
184. See id. at288-98, 328.
185. See id. at 220-26, 307-09, 432-34, 477-78, 514-15, 539-43 (recording the difficulty
encountered by officials at the Centers for Disease Control in compelling the blood banking
industry to stop the potential spread of AIDS by recognizing that the disease could be transmitted
through blood, and by taking prudent measures to screen donated blood).
186. See, e.g., id at 91. Shilts observed that in 1981, scientists were not eager to begin
research on the disease that would later be termed AIDS "because there was little glory, fame, and
funding to be had in this field; there wasn't likely to be money or prestige as long as the newspa-
pers ignored the outbreak and the press didn't like writing about homosexuals." Id at 144. In
1982, during hearings by the Congressional Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, a
representative from the National Cancer Institute announced it would release one million dollars
for multi-centered Kaposi Sarcoma research, a sadly inadequate figure because "[a] grant to a
single research center for one project often ran beyond ten million." Id.
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not, the emergency room serves several functions in the hospi-
tal. The emergency room is a point of entry through which
much desired hospital admissions are made. Further, by offer-
ing an emergency room open without regard to ability to pay,
the indigent ill appear, sometimes presenting medical mysteries
that challenge medical science and that untreated, may threaten
the greater community."7 As many of the indigent themselves
suspected almost two hundred years ago, 8' they are valuable
to hospitals because of the training ground they provide to the
interns and residents who staff emergency rooms.
Adoption of this proposal may mean, however, that cate-
gorically exempt hospitals will refer screened and clearly stable
nonemergency cases189 to other local public or nonprofit hos-
pitals that are better equipped to handle these patients."9 Or,
perhaps, it may mean that categorically exempt hospitals will
require a token payment, which may reduce the number of
nonurgent cases, while not deterring those in need of emergen-
cy care, from coming to the emergency department.'91 By
reducing inefficient and unnecessary healthcare expenditures,
the funds are redirected toward more efficient utilization, the
national fisc is protected, and the community benefit is ad-
vanced.
Ironically, requiring hospitals to render greater levels of
uncompensated care may result in unintended consequences.
187. The gay men who first appeared at hospitals with what became known as AIDS were
generally affluent and had, at least at the beginning of the crisis, health insurance. The IV. needle-
users, however, typically had no health insurance, and were indigent If they had not had access to
an emergency room at hospitals like Montefiore in New York City and San Francisco General in
California, the transmissibility of AIDS from mother to fetus would have gone undiscovered for a
longer period of time, as would the discovery that AIDS operates in a fundamentally different
manner in I.V. injectors than in gay men. See SHmLTs, supra note 183, at 103-04. Further, history
has shown the inexorable connection between poverty and illness. See generally CHARLES E.
ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS (1962).
188. STARR, supra note 32, at 152 (stating that the sick poor were distrustful of hospitals
because of the fear that they would be used for surgical experimentation, or, still worse, once
dead, used for anatomical dissection).
189. Nothing in this proposal would undermine the obligations of meta-hospitals under the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1995).
190. At Maine Medical Center's Emergency Department, a free mini-van transports such
patients to Brighton First Care, with whom Maine Medical is affiliated. Tux Turkel, Maine Med's
Grand Plan, PORTLAND (MAINE) PRESS HERALD, Jan. 19, 1997, at 1A. Patients are better served
because they are treated sooner. Id. Maine Medical is pleased because routine illnesses can be
treated more economically at Brighton. Id. As a result of this program, Maine Medical can reduce
the number of employees needed in its emergency room. Id.
191. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
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Currently, competition from for-profits, lower reimbursement
from third-party payers, increased bad debt and empty beds,
and increased cost control mechanisms from managed care
organizations have all resulted in decreased hospital profitabili-
ty. Financially vulnerable, some nonprofit hospitals have
closed, or will be closing, their doors." Other nonprofits are
finding salvation in conversions'93 and sales to for-profit cor-
porations.'94 One healthcare economist has observed:
[Tihe instability, bankruptcies, and falling profits of the 1980s
have given way to a new wave of consolidations in the 1990s
[in which] [i]n 1995 alone, there were 447 community hospitals
in play in takeover negotiations, as well as several hundred
more that had been sold in four large corporate mergers. 95
This will have profound repercussions, not only for charity
care, but for healthcare in general."9
As conversions and sales of non-profit hospitals to for-
192. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 48, at 45. See also Elizabeth Rosenthal, Groups
Predict New York Hospital Closings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at Al (reporting that the
"managed care revolution steamrolling through New York City," would result in the closure of at
least fifteen hospitals in New York City, with the most likely targets being those that serve large
numbers of uninsureds or patients on Medicare).
193. See Sandy Lutz, VHA Joins Effort to Aid For-Profit Conversions, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 3 (reporting that "the need for capital, coupled with an increasing openness to the
for-profit form," has spurred conversion to for-profit status"); Arlan R. Yoder, Is Being Tax-Ex-
empt Really Better?, 32 HosP. FIN. MGMT. 8, 8 (1978) (observing that changes in healthcare have
encouraged many hospitals to convert to for-profit status). See also Robert Kuttner, Columbial-
HCA and the Resurgence of the For-Profit Hospital Business, Part 1, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 362,
362 (1996) (reporting that conversions of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit status have risen from
34, in 1994 to 58, in 1995).
194. See, e.g., Pamela Gaynor, Sale of Non-Profits Raises Questions, PrrrSBURGH POST-GA-
zETTr, Dec. 22, 1995, at Bll (reporting that "[siales of non-profit hospitals to for-profit
companies have been occurring at a breakneck pace"); Jay Greene, Charity Care Falls After
Oklahoma Hospital's Sale, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 13, 1995, at 36 (reporting that in the year
- after Hospital Corporation of America acquired Presbyterian Hospital, a 311-bed Oklahoma City
nonprofit hospital, charity care dropped from $1.9 million to $165,000); Charles Stein, Healthy
Competition? Possible Sale of Hospital to For-Profit Chain Raises Concerns, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 25, 1995, at 47 (reporting that MetroWest Medical Center, in Framingham, Massachusetts,
was soliciting bids from at least one for-profit chain, widely rumored to be Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corporation).
195. Kuttuer, supra note 193, at 363.
196. See, e.g., Gaynor, supra note 194, at BIl (reporting that the continued sale of non-
profit hospitals to for-profit chains will likely result in "the largest redeployment of charitable
assets in history, potentially involving tens of billions of dollars"). The concern is that these
charitable assets not be redeployed in ways that will serve private interests. See Louise Kertesz,
California Group Adopts Policy on For-Profit Conversion, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 22, 1996, at
12 (reporting that the California Healthcare Association has adopted a policy "on the rights and
charitable obligations of not-for-profit healthcare organizations when they convert to for-profit
status," resolving to impress with a charitable trust the assets of nonprofits).
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profit chains continue to reduce the number of nonprofit hospi-
tals, uncompensated care will likely decrease. For-profit hospi-
tals do render uncompensated care, of both the charitable and
bad debt variety." But how much of it they render is hotly
debated.19 8 One report indicates that 3,440 nonprofit hospitals
rendered $8.4 billion in uncompensated care in 1988; 1,149
for-profits provided only $1.4 billion during the same peri-
od.Y This averages out to approximately $2,441,860.46 per
nonprofit hospital, and $1,218,450.84 per for-profit. These
figures suggest that, on average, nonprofits render twice as
much uncompensated care as is offered by for-profits.2
However, these figures may "overstate the contribution of for-
profits somewhat, because their charges are higher." 1  Fur-
thermore, other figures indicate that in some regions, for-profit
hospitals render far less charity care. In Florida, for-profit
hospitals, accounting for fifty-six percent of the institutions and
thirty-four percent of the beds, rendered only eight percent of
the charity care and twenty percent of uncompensated Medic-
aid care. In Tennessee, where for-profits account for forty-four
percent of hospitals and thirty-five percent of beds, for-profit
hospitals "provide only three percent of charity care."
But since for-profits do render some measure of charitable
care, and if, as has been claimed, the exemption is a subsidy
given to promote indigent care, then why do for-profits not
197. See GAO/H.R. Doc. 90-84, supra note 21, at 12. See also Regina E. Herzlinger &
William S. Krasker, Who Profits from Nonprofits?, HARv. BUS. REv. Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 93 (find-
ing that, as compared with nonprofit hospitals, for-profit hospitals make their services available to
as many, if not more, patients).
198. See Milligan, supra note 23, at 23 (concluding that "for-profit hospitals are financially
successful not because they are intelligently managed, but rather, because they systematically
exclude the uninsured poor"); Barbara Arrington & Cynthia Carter Haddock, Who Really Profits
From Not-For-Profits?, 25 HEALTHt SERv. REs. 291, 303 (1990). Responding to Herzlinger &
Krasker, supra note 197, Arrington & Haddock examined data from the same time period, but
viewed a larger data set and utilized a different statistical technique. They found that nonprofits
return more social benefit, as defined by, inter alia, access to care, than do nonprofits. See also
Jan P. Clement, et al., What Do We Want and What Do We Get From Not-For-Profit Hospitals?,
39 Hosp. & HEALTH SERv. AnMIw. 159, 159 (1994) (explaining data of how not-for-profit
hospitals offer benefits to the community); Greene, supra note 193, at 36.
199. See GAO/H.R. Doc. 90-84, supra note 21, at 12.
200. See also Kuttner, supra note 193, at 365 (citing a report by the Georgia State Health
Planning Agency that found that in 1993, nonprofit hospitals rendered "twice as much charity care





receive a subsidy for their provision of charitable care? The
short answer is the nondistributional constraint, which differ-
entiates nonprofits from for-profits. But this answer is only
satisfying if the exemption for hospitals can be justified. Al-
though a detailed discussion regarding the continued viability
of non-profit hospitals' tax exemption is beyond the scope of
this Note, and is available elsewhere," some brief statement
is in order.
Certainly, under the Bittker and Rahdert income measure-
ment theory,' the exemption requires no justification. If the
exemption is not a subsidy, but rather a matter of administra-
tive convenience, then no quid pro quo could be required. And
under Atkinson's altruism theory, 5 the exemption is pre-
mised on the funders, controllers, and beneficiaries all being
nonidentical, which entitles complying organizations to the
exemption, regardless of the merits of their product or the
public benefit derived therefrom. But Congress, the Service,
and hospitals themselves assume the exemption is a subsidy,
whether traditional or for capital. Given hospitals' ability to
raise capital through tax exempt bonds, arguably Hansmann's
capital subsidy theory is inapplicable. Then justification must
rest upon a traditional subsidy. And in a world in which for-
profits render good quality healthcare, is there still a justifica-
tion for the exemption?
The nondistributional constraint, which prevents nonprofit
hospitals from distributing their profits, may be more important
now than ever before, because market failure still exists within
hospitals, in that there continue to be "disparities of informa-
tion and bargaining power between 'seller' and 'consum-
er. ''  These disparities of information can become critical.
Entrepreneurs, by directly imposing market principles on hos-
pitals, overturn the explicit understandings that have allowed
doctors and hospitals to balance professionalism, profitability,
and service .... [B]y weakening the professionalism that has
traditionally served as a counterweight to the profit motive in
203. See Colombo, supra note 27 and accompanying text (arguing that tax exemption for
hospitals/healthcare providers is an anachronism that should be ended).
204. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 9, at 307-16.
205. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 501.
206. Kutmer, supra note 193, at 363.
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medicine, the investor-owned chains risk undercutting clinical
care as they relentlessly pursue cost savings. In theory, the
competitive marketplace prevents any deterioration in quality,
because dissatisfied customers are free to take their business
elsewhere. But the healthcare system is rife with well-known
asymmetries of information and "customers" who are essentially
captive. By attracting the doctor and the insurance plan or
HMO, the for-profit chain brings along the patient. Insofar as
the investor-owned chains initiate a cost-cutting "race to the
bottom" among hospitals, effective consumer choice is preclud-
ed, because rival hospitals pursue essentially similar econo-
mies. '
Further, managed care organizations, by virtue of their "gag
provisions" and economic credentialling, which create addi-
tional monetary incentives for physicians and hospitals to de-
liver less care, have inserted a new fear factor into what is
already a complicated decision. It is difficult to know which
hospitals render the best care, and unfortunately, few of us
research this question until we find that we need the answer in
a hurry. By then, because we are ill, there is no time to re-
search. Depending upon how ill we become, we may be highly
compromised and vulnerable, and certainly not in any appro-
priate position to evaluate critically such complex issues.
Further, if lowered reimbursements and increased empty
beds have created incentives to render less care, tort reform
threatens to remove the last patient protection against such
acts, by capping medical malpractice damages.' But in an
era when many economic incentives are presented to hospitals
to do less, the threat of a large malpractice judgment remains a
serious incentive to do at least enough, if not more. By remov-
ing or reducing the threat of liability for medical wrongs, legis-
lators will be removing a very powerful patient weapon to
207. Id. at 363-64.
208. Early examples of state tort reform legislation include California's Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act of 1975, CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1996) (placing a $250,000
cap on non-economic injuries in medical malpractice cases); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.202 (West
1995). For more recent tort reform legislation refer to ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-544, 6-5-547 (1996)
(limiting non-economic losses to $400,000 and total judgment to $1 million in medical
malpractice cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407 (1995) (limiting compensatory damages in
medical malpractice actions to $250,000 and total amount recoverable to $1 million); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1996) (capping recovery in medical malpractice actions to a total of
$1 million); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 1997) (limiting total non-economic damages to
$350,000).
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induce high, or at least acceptable quality medical care.'t
Managed care, tort reform, and a competitive market are all
forces that will act to reduce care. Nonprofits, by virtue of the
nondistributional constraint embodied in section 501(c)(3),
have one less incentive to do so.
Thus, the short answer to why for-profits that render chari-
ty care do not get the exemption subsidy is because they dis-
tribute their profits, creating an incentive to charge more and
do less, in an environment where that incentive already exists,
and threatens to become greater. And the incentive to do less is
why for-profits render less charity care than do nonprofits, for
"in a purely for-profit enterprise... there is no place for un-
compensated care, unprofitable admissions, research, education,
or public health activities-all chronic money losers from a
strictly business viewpoint.""21 Thus, by linking the exemp-
tion to a requirement that nonprofit hospitals engage in more
redistributive care, the result likely will be that hospitals will
continue, at possibly an accelerated rate, to convert or sell
themselves to for-profit entities, which ultimately will result in
less redistributive care than currently exists.
Adoption of the categorical exemption may have an effect
on the trend toward conversion and sale. If exempt meta-hos-
pitals are strengthened as a result of this proposal, they may be
in a stronger position to present "capital-starved, debt-laden
community hospitals"2 " with an alternative to accepting an
offer from a for-profit institution. If nonprofits join to form
strategic alliances with each other, they, like for-profits, can
take advantage of economies of scale, which will enable them
to purchase more for less. Further, both meta-hospital and
smaller exempt hospitals may benefit from such alliances.
209. Speaking of Florida's Medical Malpractice Reform Act, one writer observed that "the
Act has protected the wrong-doer at the expense of the innocent victim." Jessica Fonseca-Nader,
Note and Comment Florida's Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act: Is It Time For a
Change?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 551,552 (1996). For information about tort reform in general,
refer to Steven M. Weiner & Marc Reibman, Doctors Will Get More Immunity for Mistakes, N.Y.
ThsES, Mar. 22, 1995, at A18 (observing that "[t]he proposed tort reforms that seek to further
limit damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice lawsuits will dilute whatever minimal
safeguards exist to prevent malpractice").
210. Kuttner, supra note 193, at 363.
211. Alex Pham, Hospital Against Hospital: When ColumbiaIHCA Began a New Orleans
Buying Spree, Nonprofit Institutions Joined Forces, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1995, at A69.
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Smaller hospitals can offer a patient stream to the meta-hospi-
tal for specialized services, while the smaller hospitals can
benefit by being able to offer their patients better referrals and
access to clinical trials, thereby reducing their costs by sharing
administration functions with the larger hospital. 2
In the end, it is likely that the categorical exemption will
represent for exempt hospitals a brass ring that, if not as at-
tractive as that of the for-profit form, is at least more attractive
than financial dissipation. The categorical exemption, if adopt-
ed, is likely to be a brass ring for which many nonprofit hospi-
tals will reach.
V. PROPOSED SELECTION CRITERIA
Clearly, not all nonprofit hospitals fit the model en-
visioned in the proposal. Consequently, adoption of the pro-
posal will create a two-tiered exemption structure for hospitals,
wherein traditional hospitals will continue to be guided in their
exemption by Revenue Ruling 69-545, and categorical
nonprofits will be guided only by the explicit terms of section
501(c)(3). The distinction proposed in this Note is not beyond
the ability of the Service, which is accustomed to making such
distinctions." 3 However, it is necessary to develop criteria
against which the Service can evaluate the applications from
various hospitals eager to receive this categorical exemption.
Currently, in order to be recognized as exempt from feder-
al taxes, organizations must submit a Form 1023, an elaborate
application through which entities prove their eligibility. As
part of that application process, hospitals wishing to apply for
the categorical exemption should be required to complete a
212. Susan Pearsall, A Hospital Winds Up With an Out of State Partner, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
28, 1996, at 9 (writing about the benefits of the alliance between New York City's Columbia
Presbyterian hospital, "the country's oldest academic medical center," and New Milford hospital,
"one of Connecticut's smallest hospitals"); New Milford will join "seven New York and New
Jersey hospitals in the Columbia-Presbyterian Regional Network, which share information
systems, clinical programs and trials, continuing education, and managed-care contracts." Id. In
particular, Columbia-Presbyterian will not only receive referrals from Connecticut, a bedroom
suburb of New York City, but will be able to provide several services at lower cost by providing
them at the Connecticut site. Id.
213. The Service must determine whether an entity is entitled to an exemption, whether it
falls within the religious exemption, in which case it is relieved of many reporting requirements,
and whether it has engaged in more than an "insubstantial" amount of lobbying.
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proposed Schedule A, wherein they detail the research grants
they have received, the results of that research, surgical or
medical breakthroughs pioneered at the hospital, and any other
relevant information demonstrating innovation on the part of
the hospital and/or its medical staff, the ways in which that
innovation has benefitted the national community, and the
percentage of the hospital's budget dedicated to this purpose.
Only hospitals with a significant contribution to research and
innovation, as demonstrated by means of the articulated crite-
ria, should qualify for the categorical exemption. All other
nonprofit hospitals should continue to be governed by Revenue
Ruling 69-545.
It is not likely that the possibility of a categorical exemp-
tion will cause hospitals to engage in duplicative or needless
research. Research funds, far from appearing like manna from
heaven, are obtained through a laborious grant seeking pro-
cess,214 and grant applications are far from rubber-stamped.
Since research dollars are subject to the governmental axe,215
it is counter-intuitive that a grant foundation will award funds
to research that is ill advised or unnecessary. Furthermore, an
unsound research proposal, even if funded, would have to be
reviewed by an Institutional Review Board, where, ostensibly,
it would be reformed or rejected l.2 6 Finally, medical publica-
tions present a barrier to unsound research in their refusal to
publish submissions that will not advance the field.217
214. See generally BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICr OF INTEREST
(Roger J. Porter & Thomas E. Malone eds., 1992).
215. See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, The Price of Compromise, 269 Scd. 1662, 1662 (1995)
(detailing how the price of easing a deadlock in Congress over a funding bill for biomedical re-
search resulted in a smaller budget for the National Institutes of Health).
216. Greater monitoring of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) by the FDA and HHS will
likely be required as some IRBs face increased pressure to approve questionable research
proposals designed less to increase scientific knowledge than to provide indicia of research
sufficient to qualify for the categorical exemption from federal income taxation.
217. Sadly, in at least one case, a refusal by the American Academy of Pediatrics to present
what appeared to be a "batty" idea kept Dr. Arye Rubinstein's findings that AIDS was being
passed from infected mothers to their fetuses from being disseminated in a timely manner. See
SHILTS, supra note 183, at 104. The New England Journal of Medicine held Dr. Rubinstein's
article for six months, but then returned it unpublished, having concluded that the children in the
study did not have AIDS. See id. at 171-72.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is fanciful to believe that the approximately
3,363 exempt hospitals, having a total of approximately
674,197 beds, can solve the crisis in access to healthcare cur-
rently endured by forty million Americans, even if joined by
the 2,042 public hospitals, having a total of 370,466 beds,2"8
"[i]t is probably not accidental that the hospital tax-exemption
issue developed and gained steam during a period of docu-
mented growth in the number of uninsured Americans. This
source of pressure for tax-exemption reform will be present
until universal health insurance legislation is passed., 219 This
pressure should not result in wresting tax exemption from
hospitals or in adding further mechanical tests. When hospitals
work to arrest disease, restore health, and advance medical
knowledge, they have benefitted the community. Nonprofit
hospitals whose work significantly advances medical knowl-
edge should be encouraged, via the categorical tax exemption,
to dedicate their assets to the continuation of these purposes.
218. See HILL & KIRSCTmEN, supra note 20, at § 3.0112] 3-5 & 3-6 (comparing the number
of beds in public hospitals to those in tax-exempt hospitals).
219. Gray, supra note 117, at 733.
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